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This Article examines the Antiquities Act, a 1906 statute that delegates
authority to the President to establish national monuments on federal lands
for the protection of prehistoric structures and relics. This modest statute,
originally a scant one page in length, has set off a century of intermittent
controversy that its drafters could not have anticipated. Although Congress
probably intended that the statute merely protect archaeological ruins from
looting by treasure hunters, presidents quickly began to utilize the statute to
preserve large natural landscapes-ranging from President Theodore
Roosevelt's establishment of the 800, 000-acre Grand Canyon National Mon-
ument in 1908 to President Clinton's reservation of about five million acres
of national monuments from 1996-2001. Some outraged politicians and
observers have called for the repeal of the Act and the reversal of executive
monument designations. This Article contends that the controversy over the
Act is illustrative of a larger phenomenon-the philosophical view that
human culture is distinct from nature. Professor Klein argues that it is time
to abandon the rigid legal wall between nature and culture, and to validate
explicitly almost a century of past practice preserving large natural areas of
historic and scientific significance- "monumental landscapes"--as
antiquities.
INTRODUCTION
In 1906, Congress passed a one-page statute called the Antiquities
Act, delegating authority to the President to declare small tracts of
federal lands as "national monuments."' Congress intended simply to
protect the nation's archaeological treasures from looting in order to
preserve relics such as prehistoric pottery shards, burial mounds, and
cliff dwellings. 2 The casual reader may think of modest educational
sites and stifle a yawn while recalling tedious family vacation stops at
historic battlefields and national landmarks.
3
The executive branch, however, had a more grandiose view of the
Antiquities Act. The congressional ink had barely dried before Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt declared seventeen national monuments,
including the 808,120-acre Grand Canyon National Monument and
1 Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2000)).
2 See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
3 The Antiquities Act has been utilized to create small historic monuments, includ-
ing the Lewis & Clark National Monument (160 acres), the Statue of Liberty National
Monument (2.50 acres), Fort Matanzas National Monument (1 acre), and the Big Hole
Battlefield National Monument (195 acres). See 146 CONG. REc. S7030-32 (daily ed. July
17, 2000) (listing name and acreage of national monuments created by each president).
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the 639,000-acre Mount Olympus National Monument.4 Numerous
other presidents followed suit, creating monuments millions of acres
in size.5 As a result of such aggressive implementation, the statute has
been the center of almost a century of intermittent, but bitter,
controversy.
Opponents have been outraged by the reservation of large monu-
ments. Following the 1943 designation of the 221,610-acre Jackson
Hole National Monument in Wyoming, one congressman complained
that Congress never intended that a national monument approach
the size of a U.S. state.6 More recently, the Antiquities Act received
prominent media coverage as a result of President Clinton's declara-
tion of nineteen monuments covering over five million acres. 7 In re-
sponse, numerous critics decried the designations. An article printed
in the Salt Lake Tribune captured the vehemence of the criticism: 'We
need to recognize these monuments [created by President Clinton
under the Antiquities Act] for what they are: a special-interest boon-
doggle that sacrificed local populations and the American taxpayers
to appease the demands of quasi-religious special-interest groups that
the land be cleansed of humanity." In more objective terms, the Wall
Street Journal identified national monuments as political "flashpoints."9
What factors could account for such deep-rooted, emotional criti-
cism of "national monuments," a legal classification that most Ameri-
4 Id. The Grand Canyon monument was reserved in 1908 to protect "an object of
unusual scientific interest... the greatest eroded canyon in the United States." Proclama-
tion No. 794, 35 Stat. 175 (Jan. 11, 1908). President Roosevelt created the Mount Olympus
National Monument in 1909. Proclamation No. 869, 35 Stat. 2247 (Mar. 2, 1909).
5 See 146 CONG. REc. S7030-32 (daily ed. July 17, 2000) (listing monuments with a
combined area of over seventy million acres).
6 Les Blumenthal, Presidents as Preservationists: Antiquities Act Gives Chief Executive Free
Hand in Creating National Monuments, NEws TRiu. (Tacoma, Wa.), May 28, 2000, at Al; see
discussion infra Part I.C.2.
7 President Clinton declared nineteen new monuments and expanded three existing
monuments. Reed McManus, Six Million Sweet Acres, SIEmRA, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 41, 42.
8 Rainer Huck, Clinton's Monument Designations Must Not Be Allowed to Stand, SALT
LNKE TRtB., Mar. 23, 2001, at A15. Huck, the president of the Utah Shared Access Alliance,
expressed the view that "[the President has] shamelessly and brazenly abuse[d] power in
the pursuit of his own self-aggrandizement."
9 Shailagh Murray & Laurie McGinley, Interior, HHS Nominees Lay Out Goals of Incom-
ing Administration, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 19, 2001, at A4; see also Shawn Foster, Monument Anger
Still Simmering SALT LAKE TmB., June 2, 2001, at BI (citing Rep. Chris Cannon's statement
that the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument "was a monster that was created by
political appetite," and that "[t]he Clinton administration could not stop coal mining with
the law so they stopped it with an illegal use of the Antiquities Act"); Daniel Sneider, "Sage-
brush Rebels" Learn thw Fine Art of Compromise, CHRIsTLAN Sci. MONITOR, Oct. 31, 1996, at 4
(quoting a critic of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument who argued that
"[w]hat Bruce Babbitt and his friend are trying to do is take our freedom, our livelihoods,
our traditional way of life away from us and run us off').
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cans would be hard-pressed to define?10 And why has the Antiquities
Act endured for almost one hundred years, despite such criticism?
This Article draws upon the disciplines of law and history in an at-
tempt to answer these questions. The inquiry reveals that the contro-
versy over the Antiquities Act is but an outgrowth of a broader
paradigm that has dominated human thought for centuries-the di-
chotomy between nature and culture. This philosophical schism has
profoundly influenced the law of natural resources. As a result,
lawmakers instinctively have established one regulatory scheme for
"wild" nature, and another separate and distinct regime for "tamed"
landscapes.
Part I of this Article places the Antiquities Act into historical con-
text. Despite the apparently limited intentions of the 1906 Congress,
all three branches of government consistently have endorsed the pro-
tection of large landscapes as "antiquities."" This conclusion is sur-
prising in light of current political rhetoric, which suggests that the
executive branch alone has been responsible for aggressive implemen-
tation of the statute. 12 Despite this popular misconception, history
demonstrates that Congress and the courts have acquiesced in an ex-
pansive interpretation of the Act. The easiest explanation for such
acquiescence focuses upon the ambiguity of the statutory text: al-
though the statute restricts monuments to the "smallest area compati-
ble" with the protection of prehistoric structures and objects, it also
contains a broad loophole allowing presidents to protect objects of
"historic or scientific interest."' 3 Relying upon that more expansive
language, presidents beginning with Theodore Roosevelt have pro-
tected large natural features such as the Grand Canyon as "objects of
scientific interest."'1 4 Congress, for its part, has bypassed numerous
opportunities to repeal or modify the statute, 15 and has enacted signif-
10 In an amusing travel article, one contributor to Money magazine wrote that while
bragging to friends that he had just driven "about 14,000 miles, passed through 25 states,
visited five national parks and three national monuments, [and eaten] at 14 different bar-
becue joints" he was cut short by an inquiry about the distinction between national parks
and national monuments. See Paul Lukas, American Beauties, MONEY, June 2001, at 133.
The author recalls that he "blinked, thought for a moment, and realized [he] hadn't the
slightest idea." Id. Although prior to the trip he had "instinctively assumed that national
monuments were man-made structures, like the Washington Monument," his travel experi-
ence proved that assumption to be false. See id.
11 See infra Part I.A.-C.
12 See, e.g., Huck, supra note 8; William Perry Pendley, Grand Staircase-Escalante Na-
tional Monument: Protection of Antiquities or Preservationist Assault?, UTAH B.J., Oct. 1997, at 8,
8.
13 See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
14 See Blumenthal, supra note 6.
15 See infra Parts I.G, III.A.2.
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icant amendments only twice during the past century.16 Similarly, the
courts have had five chances during the twentieth century to check
the presidents' expansive interpretation of their statutory authority,
but have declined to do so in every case. 17 The U.S. Supreme Court,
for example, has supported presidential discretion to create monu-
ments up to 800,000 acres in size, and has approved such diverse mon-
ument purposes as the protection of geologic features, prehistoric
lakes, and rare species of fish. 18
However, something much more fundamental than ambiguous
statutory interpretation is fueling the ardent anger of the critics. Part
II contends that the Antiquities Act transgresses the historically sanc-
tioned separation of nature and culture. An exploration of Western
cultural norms as expressed through literature, art, science, and relig-
ion reveals a long tradition of distinguishing human society from wild
nature. From this perspective, perhaps the primary sin of the Antiqui-
ties Act is its unwitting synthesis of the human and natural realms, as it
simultaneously protects large landscapes and the relics of ancient
human civilizations under a single statutory scheme. The rage of
monument opponents may reflect their implicit notion that the Antiq-
uities Act violates an important norm of civilized societies.
This philosophical separation has not been confined to the An-
tiquities Act, but has affected much in the area of natural resources
law. As legislators have struggled to define the appropriate role of
nature in a civilized society, they have relied perhaps overmuch upon
rigid, objective boundaries between nature and culture as a substitute
for a messy, subjective dialogue about the proper use of wild lands. As
discussed in Part II, statutes such as the Antiquities Act, the Wilder-
ness Act, and the Endangered Species Act make important resource
decisions dependent upon such narrow, technical questions as the
physical size of an area, whether roads are present, and whether
humans have relocated a species to a new geographic area. Part II
concludes that such an unyielding legal line between nature and
humans is both biologically infeasible and legally undesirable.
Finally, Part III delineates a modern role for the Antiquities Act
as it enters its second century of existence. This Part describes recent
threats by President George W. Bush and Congress to reverse the pre-
vious administration's monument designations and notes that the suc-
cess of such efforts has been disproportionately slow when compared
to the vehemence of the political criticism. Part III develops the hy-
16 See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing congressional amendments to the Act that precluded
the designation of additional monuments in Wyoming and limited the designation of addi-
tional monuments in Alaska).
17 See discussion infra Part I.B.
18 See discussion infra Parts I.B.1, I.B.3.
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pothesis that the Act's longevity may be attributable to its ability to
serve at least four core values identified by the public and by the
courts: (1) the protection of land from development; (2) the recogni-
tion of "living landscapes"; (3) the ability to take emergency action to
preserve the status quo of threatened lands; and (4) the vesting of
political accountability directly in the President, rather than burying
monument responsibility deep within a bureaucratic structure. This
Article suggests that Congress and the courts should explicitly validate
a century of past practice under which presidents have protected large
landscapes as antiquities, provided that the President deems such
lands to hold historic or scientific interest, and provided that the Pres-
ident is willing to accept political responsibility for the monument
designations.
I
THE PROBLEM: UNINTENDED LANDSCAPE PRESERVATION
[National Monuments comprise] another federal lands category that was cre-
ated, perhaps inadvertently, by passage of the 1906 Antiquities Act.19
Presidents have consistently relied upon the Antiquities Act to
protect both unique natural resources and human landscapes. Ironi-
cally, the 1906 Congress may not have had natural resource protection
in mind when it passed the legislation. Initially proposed and drafted
by a non-partisan committee of anthropologists, 20 the statute might
be characterized best as cultural properties legislation. In short
order, however, presidents pressed the Act into service as a mecha-
nism to protect large tracts of land,21 filling a void that no other legis-
lation at the time had addressed. 22 Arguably, to this day the Act
19 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 140
(3d ed. 1993) (noting that "[a]lIthough only the smallest area compatible with preservation
is to be ... reserved, huge areas such as Death Valley and Glacier Bay have been pro-
claimed monuments").
20 David J. Meltzer, Prehistory, Power and Politics in the Bureau of American Ethnology,
1879-1906, in THE SOcIo-PoLrrcs OF ARCHAEOLOGY 67, 74 (Joan M. Gero et al. eds., 1983).
21 See discussion infra Part I.A.
22 Commentators have long bemoaned the fragmented, media-by-media approach of
federal environmental laws and their failure to address pollution on a comprehensive ba-
sis. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59-60 (2d ed. 1994) (dis-
cussing the need for integrated pollution control to avoid problems of fragmented
responsibilities and cross-media pollution). Natural resource law, too, arguably has suf-
fered from a failure to apply standards on an ecosystem-wide basis. See, e.g., Oliver A.
Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REv. 869, 975
(1997) (evaluating the Endangered Species Act and warning that although landscape-level
planning is desirable, planners also must continue to protect species on an individual ba-
sis); J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven Degrees of Relevance 14 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 156, 156 (2000) (considering the ecosystem management movement
and arguing that "while there is no substantial body of hard law to apply today, there will
138 [Vol. 87:1333
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continues to fill a unique niche unoccupied by any other modem
legislation.23
The protection of the remnants of historic human cultures-to-
gether with the landscapes that supported them-has resulted in an
arguably inadvertent group of federal lands that this Article will call
"monumental landscapes." In its most precise sense, the word land-
scape does not refer to natural environmental features, but rather to "a
synthetic space, a man-made system of spaces superimposed on the face
of the land."24 Under an early Gothic interpretation, the lone syllable
land meant a "plowed field, '25 certainly the quintessential example of
human manipulation of the natural world. Accordingly, landscape
evokes an area of human proportions, a bounded space that can be
"comprehend[ed] at a glance."26 The Antiquities Act reflects this inti-
mate conception of landscapes because it contemplates the protection
of only small tracts of land that have been marked by a human
presence.27
The statute, however, simultaneously permits the protection of
natural areas of "historic or scientific interest. '28 Under the etymol-
ogy discussed above, this provision of the Antiquities Act creates an
oxymoronic vision, that of the natural landscape that simultaneously
implies the absence and presence of human manipulation. Despite
the questionable pedigree of such a notion, it has firmly permeated
the consciousness of the American public, which "tend[s] to think
that landscape can mean natural scenery only."29 This Article uses the
term "monumental landscape" to capture the tension between large
and small, as well as natural and human, and to suggest that even
wilderness areas may have links to both science and history that make
them legitimate candidates for protection under the Antiquities Act.
The Antiquities Act delegates discretionary authority to the Presi-
dent to proclaim federally owned tracts of land as national
monuments:
be someday soon, and lawyers wishing to shape the future appearance of that body of law
ought to take an interest in its evolution, beginning now") (emphasis in original).
23 For a discussion of the "living landscape" protection the Antiquities Act provides,
see infra notes 399-402 and accompanying text.
24 JOHN B. JACKSON, DISCOVERING THE VERNACULAR LANDSCAPE 8 (1984) (italics in
original).
25 Id. at 6 (quoting Grimm's dictionary of the German language and its definition of
land as "the plot of ground or the furrows in a field that were annually rotated").
26 Id. at 3 (discussing the three-hundred-year-old definition "drawn up for artists"
under which a landscape is a "portion of land which the eye can comprehend at a glance"
and noting that the word originally meant a picture of a view, rather than the view itself).
27 See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
28 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000); see also discussion infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text
(discussing the practical effect of this language).
29 SeeJAcKoN, supra note 24, at 5 (contrasting the American approach with the En-
glish notion that "a landscape almost always contains a human element").
20021 1339
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The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion,
to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific in-
terest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States to be national monuments, and
may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in
all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be protected. 0
The Act also provides criminal penalties for the unauthorized appro-
priation or destruction of protected objects.3 1
The legislative history suggests that Congress intended to author-
ize the President to withdraw only small portions of land for the pro-
tection of archaeological sites. In 1906, much as today, some critics
feared that the legislation would pose a threat to the development of
resources in the West.3 2 The House Report indicated that the legisla-
tion's purpose was to protect historic and prehistoric ruins in the
Southwest, including cliff dwellings, communal houses, shrines, and
burial mounds.33 The Report stated that the bill was designed to "cre-
ate small reservations reserving only so much land as may be abso-
30 16 U.S.C. § 431.
31 Section 433 of the Act provides:
Any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic
or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on
lands owned or controlled by the... United States, without [federal per-
mission] . ..shall, upon conviction, be fined in a sum of not more than
$500 or be imprisoned for a period of not more than ninety days, or shall
suffer both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Id. § 433. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have considered whether § 433 is unconstitution-
ally vague. See United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 941, 943 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding
conviction of defendants for removal of antiquities from prehistoric Mimbres ruin and
holding that § 433 is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113,
114-15 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing conviction of defendant for appropriation of Native
American face masks that were less than five years old and finding § 433 unconstitutionally
vague for its failure to define key terms such as "object of antiquity"). Subsequent to its
holding in Diaz, the Ninth Circuit may have modified its position. See United States v.
Austin, 902 F.2d 743, 745 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to find a successor statute to the
Antiquities Act unconstitutionally vague for its use of undefined terms such as "weapons"
and "tools").
32 The Chief Archaeologist of the National Park Service observed that "[f]rom the
beginning, Westerners saw the Antiquities Act as another land withdrawal, a threat to de-
velopment in the West," and commented that "[t]he debate was very similar to today's."
Blumenthal, supra note 6.
33 H.R. RFe. No. 59-2224, at 2 (1906) (citing memorandum from Professor Edgar L.
Hewett). The Report referred to the "urgent need" for preservation because an extensive
traffic in relics had developed:
These relics are priceless when secured by proper scientific methods, and
of comparatively little value when scattered about either in museums or
private collections without accompanying records. No scientific man is true
to the highest ideals of science who does not protest against this outrageous
traffic, and it will be a lasting reproach upon our Government if it does not
use its power to restrain it.
Id. at 3.
1340 [Vol. 87:1333
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lutely necessary for the preservation of these interesting relics of
prehistoric times."3 4 During the floor debate, Iowa Republican John
Lacey introduced the Senate bill as one that would "merely make
small reservations" in areas of cave and cliff dwellers.3 5 Moreover,
"[n] ot very much" land would be taken off the market, and it would
be the "smallest area necesstry [sic] for the care and maintenance of
the objects to be preserved. '3 6 One representative asked, "Would it be
anything like the forest-reserve bill, by which seventy or eighty million
acres of land in the United States have been tied up?"37 Lacey replied,
"Certainly not. The object is entirely different. It is to preserve these
old objects of special interest and the Indian remains in the pueblos
in the Southwest, whilst the other reserves the forests and the water
courses."3 8 The statutory text reflects this narrow legislative intent in
two important ways. First, the Act authorizes the President to protect
"objects," without specific reference to natural resources.3 9 Second,
although Congress authorized the President to reserve tracts of land,
that authority is limited to the "smallest area compatible" with the ob-
jects' protection.40
In spite of such restrictive text and legislative history, presidents
have reserved millions of acres of land under the statute. One expla-
nation for such "unintended landscape preservation" is based upon
the evolution of the statutory text during the legislative process. Two
significant amendments were added to the original bill, using lan-
guage that presidents and courts have interpreted broadly. First, the
statutory protection of prehistoric and historic "landmarks and struc-
tures" was expanded to include also the protection of objects of "his-
toric or scientific interest."41 That phrase, perhaps more than any
other, has opened the door for presidents to reserve vast tracts of land
as monuments, beginning with the protection of the mile-deep Grand
Canyon as an "object of unusual scientific interest."42 Second, the lim-
itation on monument acreage was relaxed throughout the legislative
34 Id. at 1.
35 40 CONG. REc. H7888 (1906) (comments of Rep. John Lacey).
36 Id
37 Id. The Forest Reserve eventually encompassed even larger amounts of territory.
See David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw
Lands, 22 NAT. RESOuRCESJ. 279, 286 (1982) (observing that between 1891 and 1909, presi-
dents had used the Forest Reserve provision in the General Revision Act to set aside more
than 194 million acres).
38 40 CONG. REc. H7888 (1906) (comments of Rep. John Lacey).
39 See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
40 See id.
41 See Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1854 (D.
Alaska 1980) (noting that executive authority under the Act was "much enlarged" by the
addition of language allowing for preservation of "other objects of historic or scientific
interest").
42 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
13412002]
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process. An earlier bill passed by the Senate would have limited mon-
ument size to 640 acres.43 That restriction was deleted from the final
bill in favor of language entrusting the final size determination to ex-
ecutive discretion, subject to the amorphous qualification that monu-
ments must be "confined to the smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be protected."''44 As a
result of these two textual modifications, the Antiquities Act may not
be as limited as its legislative history suggests. 45
Throughout the past century, opponents of large monuments
have emphasized the bill's original narrow text and legislative history,
whereas monument supporters have relied upon the more expansive
amendatory language that found its way into the final version of the
statute. The courts and Congress generally have endorsed the latter
view, albeit through silence as much as through explicit action. 46
Does this inaction constitute tacit support for the presidents' monu-
ment declarations, a legitimate approval expressed through judicial
reticence and congressional acquiescence? Or, as one lower court re-
cently pondered, does the protection of expansive landscapes consti-
tute an illegitimate, "unintentional conspiracy" by all three branches
of government?47 To assist in answering these questions, the follow-
ing subparts examine the first hundred years of practice by presidents,
courts, and Congress under the Antiquities Act.
43 See Getches, supra note 37, at 302 n.126 (citation omitted).
44 See id.
45 Several of the most conservative members of the current Supreme Court have indi-
cated a distrust of excessive reliance upon legislative history, based in part upon the ability
of legislators to insert self-serving-but not necessarily accurate-statements into the legis-
lative record. See generally Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 390 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (declaring that statements of individual legislators are not a reliable
indication of Congress's intent in voting for a particular statute); Paul H. Edelman & Jim
Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86
MINN. L. REv. 131, 212-13 & n.226 (2001) (discussing objection of Justices Thomas and
Scalia to the Court's use of legislative history).
46 See discussion, infra Parts I.B, I.C.
47 In 1999, a federal district court in Utah suggested that congressional failure to
amend or repeal the Antiquities Act in the face of aggressive executive implementation
may constitute an "unintentional conspiracy" rather than congressional ratification. Utah
Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, Nos. 2:97CV479, 2:97CV492, 2:97CV863, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15852, at *58-*67 (D. Utah Aug. 12, 1999) (rejecting the argument that Congress
ratified President Clinton's creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
through budget appropriations and legislative inaction). The court stated:
If the court were to find congressional ratification based on the limited
record in the present case it could quite possibly be the final act in a drama
that accomplishes a set aside of 1.7 million acres of Utah land in which not
one branch of government operated within its constitutional authority. It
could be in effect an unintentional conspiracy of the three branches of gov-
ernment to do something none of them actually legally did, and thereby
rob the people of their voice.
Id. at *64 (emphasis added).
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A. Executive Zeal
During the twentieth century, presidents proclaimed more than
one hundred national monuments, covering more than seventy mil-
lion acres of land.48 Fourteen of the seventeen presidents in office
during the century have utilized the Act, including members of both
political parties. 49 Individual monument size has varied from less
than one acre to almost eleven million acres, and almost half of all
executively created monuments were initially five thousand acres or
more in size.50 Congress has also established additional monuments
through legislation, independent of the Antiquities Act's delegation
of authority to the President.51
Immediately after the passage of the Antiquities Act in 1906, pres-
idents began to exercise their newly delegated authority with vigor.
Republican President Theodore Roosevelt continued to establish
monuments until the last two days of his presidency. 52 By the end of
1909, he had designated seventeen areas, including the 800,000-acre
Grand Canyon National Monument and the 639,000-acre Mount
Olympus National Monument.53 The U.S. Supreme Court did not ad-
dress the scope of the Executive's authority under the Act until its
1920 decision in Cameron v. United States.54 By that time, three presi-
dents had established almost fifty monuments incorporating over 2.7
million acres,55 creating an executive precedent the Court may have
been unwilling to disturb.56
Later presidents continued to follow the aggressive pattern Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt first established. Republican President Cal-
vin Coolidge proclaimed fifteen monuments covering 2.6 million
acres, while Republican President Herbert Hoover established seven-
48 CAROL HARDY VINCENT & PAiELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Pub. No.
RL30528, NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND THE ANTIQUITIES ACT: RECENT DESIGNATIONS AND Is-
SUES 3, 4 n.9 (2000) (noting that "[mlost of this acreage is no longer in monument status
because it has been included by Congress in other protective designations, primarily
through enactment of [the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, 16
U.S.C. § 3213]-).
49 See id. at 3. During the twentieth century, only Presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald
Reagan, and George H.W. Bush did not designate monuments. See 146 CONG. REC. S7031-
32 (daily ed. July 17, 2000).
50 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 48, at 4.
51 Id
52 Blumenthal, supra note 6.
53 See 146 CONG. REC. S7030 (daily ed. July 17, 2000); see also The National Monument
NEPA Compliance Act: Hearing on H.t, 1487 Before the House Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks and Pub.
Lands of the Comm. on Res., 106th Cong. 24-27 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on H.IP 1487]
(listing Jewel Cave as an additional monument declared by President Roosevelt in 1908).
54 252 U.S. 450 (1920) (upholding President Theodore Roosevelt's proclamation of
the Grand Canyon National Monument). The Cameron case is discussed infra Part I.B.1.
55 See 146 CONG. REC. S7030 (daily ed. July 17, 2000); see also Hearing on H.P, 1487,
supra note 53 at 24-44 (listing monuments established by presidential proclamation).
56 See infra Part I.B.1.
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teen monuments protecting 2.1 million acres.57 During his tenure,
Democratic President Jimmy Carter declared seventeen monuments,
encompassing more than fifty-five million acres of land.58 Among his
legacies are numerous monuments in Alaska, including Gates of the
Arctic (8.2 million acres), Wrangell-St. Elias (10.9 million acres), and
Yukon Flats (10.6 million acres).59 About twenty years later, in 1996,
Democratic President Bill Clinton created in Utah the 1.7 million acre
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. 60 During his second
term of office, President Clinton designated eighteen additional mon-
uments, covering approximately 3.3 million acres. 61
B. Judicial Reticence
There has been strikingly little judicial commentary regarding
the scope of executive authority under the Antiquities Act. The U.S.
Supreme Court has addressed the issue only twice, its total discussion
comprising a scant four sentences. 62 Despite the brevity of its opin-
ions, the Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed the protection of
large natural areas containing scientific curiosities such as unique geo-
logic features, tourist attractions, and rare fish life.63 In addition,
three decisions of the lower federal courts have offered deferential
support to executively created monuments. 64 By the end of the twen-
57 See 146 CONG. REC. S7030-31 (daily ed. July 17, 2000).
58 See id. at S7031. Subsequently, Congress modified the Carter monuments, but re-
tained much of the land in protective classifications. See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note
48, at 3 n.8 (explaining that "Congress rescinded these withdrawals and reestablished most
of the lands as national monuments or other protective designations (such as national
parks) in § 1322 of [the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980]").
59 See 146 CONG. REC. S7030-31 (daily ed. July 17, 2000).
60 See id. at S7030.
61 See Sanjay Ranchod, Note, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting Ecosystems with
the Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 535, 536-37 (2001). In addition, President
Clinton enlarged the boundaries of three monuments. Id. at 555. The executive tendency
to utilize narrow statutory mandates for broad preservation purposes has not been con-
fined to the Antiquities Act. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, 1Wiy Do We Protect Endangered Species,
and IWiat Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute
"Takings"?, 80 IoWA L. Rv. 297, 299-301 (1995) (observing that the Endangered Species
Act "is very much a surrogate lav for ecosystems," and considering whether critics are cor-
rect in their assertions that "[e]nvironmentalists do not really care about the Indiana bat,
the snail darter, or the northern spotted owl; they care about stopping a dam or a clearcut,
or progress in general").
62 See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976) (rejecting, in one sentence,
challenge to executive authority to create Devil's Hole Monument); Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920) (rejecting, in three sentences, challenge to executive
authority to create Grand Canyon National Monument).
63 See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142; Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455-56.
64 See Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1854 (D.
Alaska 1980); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1159-60 (D. Alaska 1978); Wyoming v.
Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945). At least three additional parties have chal-
lenged President Clinton's establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monu-
ment. See Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2001).
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tieth century, no court had invalidated the Executive's establishment
of national monuments. Rather, the courts have countenanced the
presidents' use of the Act to provide sweeping protection to large
landscapes, as well as to objects of archaeological interest.
Upon first consideration, this judicial support for zealous execu-
tive actions appears surprising. After all, presidents have designated
immense multimillion-acre monuments, and have seemed to ignore
the statutory admonition to preserve only the smallest land area neces-
sary. Why did the courts fail to curb this arguable abuse of executive
discretion? Alternatively, if presidents have acted within the bounds
of their delegated authority, why have courts been so restrained in
their consistent support of the presidential monument designations?
Three observations may help to explain this supportive, yet succinct,
judicial response.
First, separation of powers concerns permeate the courts' opin-
ions, indicating judicial uncertainty as to the scope ofjurisdiction over
disputes involving executive interpretation and discretion. 65 The An-
tiquities Act itself contains no explicit cause of action to challenge the
President's exercise of discretion. One lower court hinted that con-
troversies arising under the Executive's implementation of the Antiq-
uities Act may be nonjusticiable, but later retreated from that
position. 66 Despite that retreat, a certain judicial discomfort seems to
have prompted the courts to tread lightly when presidential preroga-
tive is at issue. As a result, judges have deferred to the Executive with
little clarifying commentary. This restraint in the judicial arena has
had an unsettling effect upon public discourse, because it has failed to
quiet allegations of illegality leveled against new monument designa-
tions, even when those new designations are similar to past executive
actions that the courts have upheld. 67
Second, the courts' support might be explained not only in terms
of deference to executive action in general, but also by deference to a
longstanding pattern of executive practice in particular. Through the
vagaries of history, no challenge reached the courts until after numer-
ous presidents had firmly established a practice of aggressive use of
the Antiquities Act.68 Three presidents had reserved millions of acres
as monuments before the first U.S. Supreme Court opinion was
handed down in 1920.69 By the time the second legal challenge was
decided in 1945, four other presidents had declared approximately
65 See discussion infra notes 103, 134-37 and accompanying text.
66 Compare Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 894 (concluding that the court had "limitedjurisdic-
don") with id. at 895-98 (nonetheless holding a full evidentiary hearing).
67 See discussion infra Part I.D.
68 See 146 CONG. REc. S7031-32 (daily ed. July 17, 2000).
69 See id.
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fifty additional monuments covering more than seven million acres.70
Although courts will not hesitate to strike down actions of the Presi-
dent that are clearly unconstitutional, perhaps the judiciary is less will-
ing to disturb a long-settled pattern of executive action based upon
the courts' view of statutory language that is even arguably susceptible
to more than one interpretation. 71
Finally, the restrained judicial tone might also demonstrate a def-
erence to Congress. Several courts have found comfort in the face of
potential executive excesses by observing that Congress can correct
any such situations without the need for judicial intrusion. 72 There is
also some suggestion that presidential monument designations merely
assist Congress, preserving the status quo of threatened lands until
Congress can take protective action.73 Therefore, judicial action
might not be warranted.
The next sections examine the five judicial decisions on executive
authority under the Antiquities Act, as rendered by the courts prior to
the end of the year 2000. This analysis attempts to expand upon the
existing literature7 4 by highlighting the three themes discussed above:
(1) deference to executive discretion, (2) affirmation of consistent
past practice, and (3) reliance upon Congress to correct executive
excess.
1. Cameron v. United States
Cameron was an action brought by the United States against a
miner who sought to exclude tourists from the popular southern rim
of the Grand Canyon. 75 President Theodore Roosevelt had reserved
70 See id.
71 For a discussion of statutory language, see supra notes 39-47 and accompanying
text; and for a discussion of methods of statutory interpretation and the public lands
arena, see Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Adminis-
trative State: Beyond the New Dea4 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 941, 1003-13, 1037-49 (2000).
72 SeeAlaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1165 (D. Alaska 1978); Wyoming v. Franke,
58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945).
73 See Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1157, 1165 (supporting Department of the Interior with-
drawals designed to "preserve the status quo until the next Congressional session could
consider the various Alaska land legislative proposals").
74 There is a small, but growing, body of literature concerning national monuments.
See Getches, supra note 37, at 300-08; Matthew W. Harrison, Legislative Delegation and Presi-
dential Authority: The Antiquities Act and the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument-A
Callfor a New Judicial Examination, 13J. ENvrL. L. & LTIG. 409 (1998); Robert H. McLaugh-
lin, The Antiquities Act of 1906: Politics and the Framing of an American Anthropology & Archaeol-
ogy, 23 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 61 (1998);James R. Rasband, The Future of the Antiquities Act,
21J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVL. L. 619 (2001); Ann E. Halden, Note, The Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument and the Antiquities Act, 8 FoRDHAm ENVrL. L.J. 713 (1997); Rich-
ard M. Johannsen, Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the Antiquities Act, 56 WASH.
L. REv. 439 (1981); Jack M. Morgan, Jr., Recent Development, Antiquities Protection Act,
1993 UTAH L. REv. 327 (1993); Ranchod, supra note 61.
75 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 454-55 (1920).
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the area in 1908 as an 800,000-acre national monument to protect the
Grand Canyon as "an object of unusual scientific interest. ' 76 Al-
though the monument proclamation withdrew the area from the op-
eration of the public land laws, a savings clause preserved any "valid"
mining claims that had been perfected prior to the reservation of the
monument.77 The United States, as plaintiff, asserted that Mr. Cam-
eron's mining claim was invalid.78 Therefore, the United States ar-
gued that the defendants were ineligible to benefit from the savings
clause even though Cameron had entered the land prior to its desig-
nation as a national monument. 79 Before the Supreme Court, appel-
lant Cameron asserted two claims: (1) that the President had
exceeded the scope of his authority in creating the national monu-
ment,80 and (2) that the courts below had improperly relied upon the
Secretary of the Interior's determination that the mining claim was
invalid.8' The Court resolved both issues in favor of the United States
by affirming the lower court's injunction that prevented the miner
from occupying the disputed tract or excluding the public from that
portion of the Grand Canyon Monument encompassed within the de-
fective mining claim.82
Based upon a literal reading of the Antiquities Act, one might
have expected the Cameron Court to strike down the monument as
excessively large. Although the statute provides specifically that mon-
uments "in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be pro-
tected, '83 the Grand Canyon National Monument approached
800,000 acres in size.84 Moreover, the Act speaks solely to the protec-
tion of "landmarks .... structures, and... objects"85-categories that
arguably do not include large geological features such as the Grand
Canyon.86 Despite the explicit language of the statute, in merely
three sentences the Court disposed of Cameron's claim that the Presi-
dent had exceeded his statutory authority:
76 Id. at 454-56. The area had been set aside previously as a forest reserve in 1893.
Id. at 455.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 456-58.
79 See id. at 458-59.
80 Id. at 455.
81 Id. at 456. In order to sustain a valid mining claim on federal lands and to exclude
others therefrom, Cameron was required to demonstrate that the land was "mineral in
character" and that he had made an adequate mineral "discovery." Id.
82 See id. at 464-65.
83 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
84 See supra text accompanying note 4.
85 16 U.S.C. § 431.
86 Cameron asserted that the monument designation was invalid because the Grand
Canyon was not a "landmark, structure, or object." Getches, supra note 37, at 303 n.131
(describing Brief for Appellant at 44-48, Cameron (No. 205).
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The act under which the President proceeded empowered him to
establish reserves embracing "objects of historic or scientific inter-
est." The Grand Canyon, as stated in his proclamation, "is an object
of unusual scientific interest." It is the greatest eroded canyon in
the United States, if not in the world, is over a mile in depth, has
attracted wide attention among explorers and scientists, affords an
unexampled field for geologic study, is regarded as one of the great
natural wonders, and annually draws to its borders thousands of
visitors. 87
From the perspective of monument opponents, this must have been
an unfortunate first test of the President's authority under the Antiq-
uities Act, because it gave the Supreme Court's imprimatur to the pro-
tection of large landscapes, at least those with important scientific
interest. Congress did not act to reverse the Court's opinion. Rather,
it incorporated the monument into the protective national park
system.88
Two aspects of the decision are particularly noteworthy. First, the
Court was generous in its support of the President, and reached issues
that were arguably extraneous to its decision.8 9 The above-quoted lan-
guage may not have been necessary to a resolution of the case, for the
Court also rejected appellants' challenge to the invalidation of Cam-
eron's mining claim.90 That holding alone may have provided a suffi-
cient basis upon which to enjoin Mr. Cameron from excluding tourists
from the public lands. Nevertheless, the Court chose to reach Cam-
eron's additional defense that the President had transgressed his stat-
utory authority in protecting the Grand Canyon, particularly in light
of factors such as its expansive size. As a result of its unwillingness to
find that the President had exceeded his authority, the Supreme
Court legitimized over a decade of executive practice protecting large
landscapes under the Antiquities Act.9 1
A second noteworthy aspect of the case is the Court's deference
to the President and its concurrence in his determination that the
800,000-acre Grand Canyon National Monument was "an object" of
"scientific interest" within the meaning of the Antiquities Act.92 Nota-
87 Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455-56.
88 See 16 U.S.C. § 221 (2000) (establishing Grand Canyon National Park).
89 The defendants had objected to the monument's size in their initial brief, but did
not fully brief the issue before the Supreme Court. See Getches, supra note 37, at 303 &
n.131.
90 Cameron, 252 U.S. at 464.
91 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
92 The Court was also quite deferential to determinations of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, and found that the Secretary had implied authority to determine the validity of min-
ing claims, even though no statute specifically conferred such authority. See Cameron, 252
U.S. at 459-62. With respect to the Secretary's invalidation of Cameron's mining claim,
the Court found that the relevant issues were factual in nature, and that the Secretary's
decision was "conclusive in the absence of fraud or imposition." Id. at 464.
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bly absent is an independent analysis of the concomitant requirement
that the monument be limited to the "smallest area" compatible with
the object's preservation. 93 Instead, the Court simply rejected the
challenge to the President's authority and accepted the President's
own recitation of his compliance with the Antiquities Act.94 Through
such unquestioning deference, the Court paved the way for several
lower courts to suggest that challenges to the establishment of na-
tional monuments might be nonjusticiable. 95
2. Wyoming v. Franke
A quarter of a century passed before the courts again considered
the scope of the Executive's authority under the Antiquities Act. In
Wyoming v. Franke, the State of Wyoming challenged President Frank-
lin Roosevelt's establishment of the 221,610-acre Jackson Hole Na-
tional Monument. 96 The plaintiff State of Wyoming squarely
presented the court with an opportunity to clarify the meaning of two
salient limitations of the Act that had been liberally construed by Pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt and prior presidents: (1) that monuments
must be limited to the preservation of objects of historic or scientific
interest, and (2) that monuments must be limited to the smallest area
compatible with the care of the protected objects. 97 Although the
court was sympathetic to Wyoming's claim that it would suffer "great
hardship and a substantial amount of injustice" if the monument des-
ignation were upheld, it dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action. 98
The court's decision is noteworthy for its deference to the Executive
and for its reliance upon Congress to remedy any potential presiden-
tial abuses.
In deference to the President, the court employed a lenient stan-
dard of review. Rejecting the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard applicable in an "ordinary suit," the court simply determined
whether the President's action had been arbitrary and capricious and
whether it had been supported by substantial evidence. 99 The court
accepted the President's contention that qualifying objects of historic
93 Although the issue had not been briefed fully, the defendants had objected to the
monument's size in both their answer and in their brief. See Getches, supra note 37, at 303
& n.131.
94 Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455.
95 See Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D. Wyo. 1945).
96 Id. at 894-95.
97 See id. at 892.
98 See id. at 896-97. Wyoming argued, and the court agreed, that the "alleged inter-
ference with the use, maintenance and control of the State highways, together with the loss
in taxation which would occur to the State, and the loss of revenue from game and fish
licenses" resulting from federal establishment and control of the monument would far
exceed the $3,000 jurisdictional threshold applicable at the time. Id. at 893.
99 See id. at 895.
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or scientific interest included early fur trapping and hunting trails,
structures of glacial formation, peculiar mineral deposits and indige-
nous plant life, and wildlife habitat.100 Under the court's liberal stan-
dard of review, it appears that virtually any natural feature would
qualify for protection, as long as the President were willing to accept
the criticism of Congress and the press.10' In fact, the court suggested
that anything short of a barren prairie might be a suitable candidate
for monument status if the President were willing to declare it as
such.102
The court also deferred to the corrective authority of Congress,
and openly pondered whether the matter was even susceptible to judi-
cial resolution. The court appeared to be in qualified agreement with
the federal defendant's assertion that the court was without authority
to hear the case, concluding that it had only a "limited jurisdiction"
over the matter.'03 The Wyoming court cited a 1919 U.S. Supreme
Court opinion for the proposition that "a mere excess or abuse of
discretion [by the President] in exerting a power given . . . involves
considerations which are beyond the reach ofjudicial power."' 0 4 The
court concluded:
In short, this seems to be a controversy between the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government in which, under the evi-
dence presented here, the Court cannot interfere .... [I]f the
Congress presumes to delegate its inherent authority to Executive
Departments which exercise acquisitive proclivities not actually in-
tended, the burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial legisla-
tion as may obviate any injustice brought about as the power and
control over and disposition of government lands inherently rests in
its Legislative branch. 105
1OO See id.
101 See id. at 895-96 (suggesting that the President's discretion can be controlled
through the "propaganda" of the press and through congressional action).
102 Id. at 895 (describing as "clearly outside the scope and purpose of the Monument
Act" a "monument ... created on a bare stretch of sage-brush prairie in regard to which
there was no substantial evidence that it contained objects of historic or scientific
interest").
103 Id. at 894 (rejecting defendant's claim of immunity, but concluding that the court
has less than full jurisdiction over the case). Despite its suggestion that the matter might be
nonjusticiable, the court held a full evidentiary hearing and allowed the government to
introduce evidence in support of its position. Id. at 895-98.
104 Id. at 896 (citing Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919)).
The court also relied upon United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940)
(holding judgment of public officer not subject to review where Congress authorized such
officer to take legislative action that officer deems necessary or appropriate to carry out the
policy of Congress, and asserting that judicial probing of the reasoning which underlies an
executive proclamation "would amount to a clear invasion of the legislative and executive
domains").
105 Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896.
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The court also deferred to Congress in the matter of executive motive.
Wyoming claimed that the President had improperly employed the
Antiquities Act, when his true intention had been to create a national
park-an action reserved solely to Congress.10 6 In response, the court
concluded that an examination of presidential motives was a subject
of public interest suitable for congressional, rather than judicial,
action. 07
Congress accepted the court's invitation to act, and passed legisla-
tion that restrained the Executive from creating any new national
monuments in the State of Wyoming. 0 8 Despite its anger at the Presi-
dent, Congress did not return the Jackson Hole monument to the
public domain.10 9 Instead, the monument was incorporated into the
congressionally created Grand Teton National Park." 0
3. Cappaert v. United States
In the second Antiquities Act case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the federal government brought an action to enjoin ranch
owners from pumping their wells in a manner that would adversely
impact the water levels of nearby Devil's Hole Monument."' Presi-
dent Harry Truman had established the forty-acre monument in 1952
for the preservation of a unique underground pool of water-the
remnant of a prehistoric chain of lakes that supported an unusual de-
sert fish believed to exist nowhere else in the world." 2 The Court
upheld the lower court's injunction against excessive well pumping,
finding that President Truman's establishment of the monument im-
pliedly reserved that quantity of unappropriated water necessary to
accomplish the purposes of the reservation, including the preserva-
tion of the Devil's Hole "pupfish."" 3
106 See id. at 892; see also 16 U.S.C. § la-5 (2000) (describing current procedure for
congressional addition of lands to the National Park System).
107 Frank4 58 F. Supp. at 896.
108 Act of Sept. 14, 1950, Pub. L. No. 787, § 1, 64 Stat. 849 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 431a (2000)).
109 See Getches, supra note 37, at 305.
110 See id.
"'l Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1976). The monument was a
detached addition to the Death Valley National Monument. Id. at 131.
112 Id. at 131-32.
113 See id. at 133, 147. The Court relied upon the reserved water rights doctrine, first
set forth in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 426 U.S. at 138. According to that
doctrine,
when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain
and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication,
reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States
acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date
of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators.
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In their defense, petitioners maintained that the Antiquities Act
did not give the President the statutory authority to reserve a pool, but
rather the authority only to protect archaeological sites. 114 The Court
summarily rejected that argument in one terse sentence, citing Cam-
eron for its conclusion that "[t]he pool in Devil's Hole and its rare
inhabitants are 'objects of historic or scientific interest"' and therefore
appropriate for protection under the Act.115 The Court's deference
to the Executive is perhaps less expected than in Cameron, for the Cap-
paerts had strong equities on their side: the survival of the pupfish
threatened the survival of the Cappaert's 12,000-acre ranch, an opera-
tion that was worth more than seven million dollars and that em-
ployed more than eighty people.1 16 Despite those factors, the Court
deferred to the Executive's determination that the pool was appropri-
ate for protection, quoting with approval from the executive procla-
mation establishing the Devil's Hole Monument. 117
4. Alaska v. Carter
Two years after Cappaert, a federal district court in Alaska consid-
ered the scope of executive authority under the Antiquities Act. In
Alaska v. Carter, the State challenged actions by the President and the
Secretary of the Interior to withdraw from appropriation and develop-
ment approximately ninety-nine million acres of federal land pending
implementation of legislative proposals to protect the land.118 The
withdrawals were part of a massive congressional effort to protect Alas-
kan lands as national parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas-an
attempt that had been stalled by vigorous opposition from Alaska and
its congressional representatives. 19 The State claimed that the execu-
tive and administrative actions violated the National Environmental
Policy Act's (NEPA) public comment requirements.1 20 The court
114 Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141-42. The text of a congressional report that accompanied
the bill creating the Antiquities Act lends some support to the petitioners' contention:
There are scattered throughout the Southwest quite a large number of very
interesting ruins. Many of these ruins are upon the public lands, and the
most of them are upon lands of but little present value. The bill proposes
to create small reservations reserving only so much land as may be abso-
lutely necessary for the preservation of these interesting relics of prehistoric
times.
H.R. REP. No. 59-2224, at 1 (1906).
115 Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142 (citing Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455
(1920)).
116 See id. at 133.
117 See id. at 131-32, 141.
118 Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (D. Alaska 1978). Of that land, President
Jimmy Carter designated more than fifty-five million acres as national monuments. See 146
CONG. REc. S7030-31 (daily ed. July 17, 2000).
119 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 308.
120 See Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1157.
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held, inter alia, that NEPA regulates only federal "agencies" and there-
fore does not apply to actions of the President himself under the An-
tiquities Act.121
Two aspects of the decision are particularly relevant to the cur-
rent discussion. First, consistent with prior decisions, the court em-
phasized the discretionary nature of executive actions under the
Antiquities Act.122 In the court's view, separation of powers concerns
prevented it from inferring that Congress intended to impose NEPA's
requirements upon the President. 23 The court dismissed as absurd
the State's argument that consultation with the Secretary of the Inte-
rior somehow transformed the President into an "agency" subject to
NEPA's requirements. 124
Second, as in Wyoming v. Franke,125 the court's deference to the
Executive was based upon the broader premise that the matter was
not well suited to judicial resolution. In particular, the court was im-
pressed by the idea that the challenged executive actions merely pre-
served the status quo of the relevant lands until Congress could enact
permanent protective legislation.' 26 Any errors of the President, in
the court's view, were appropriate targets for congressional correction
rather than resolution in the courts:
This court will not be drawn into the merits of the land issue in
Alaska under the rubric of "public interest." The ultimate decision
on public lands has been delegated to the Congress by Article I of
the Constitution and the public interest lies in allowing the Con-
gress to make the ultimate decision. That interest will be hindered
if the status quo of the concerned lands is not maintained until the
Congress can render that decision. 12 7
Congress accepted the court's challenge in 1980 and passed legisla-
tion that revoked PresidentJimmy Carter's withdrawals, but protected
121 See id. at 1159. The issue of NEPA's relevance to the establishment of national
monuments has been raised in a more recent lawsuit filed by counties in Utah. See Plain-
tiff's Complaint at 2, Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, No. 2:97CV-0479B (D. Utah filed
July 31, 1997). In an attempt to circumvent the persuasive authority of Carter, perhaps, the
Utah plaintiffs allege that the challenged national monument was created by President Bill
Clinton "at the instigation" of Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt, who launched an "unprece-
dented campaign" to persuade the President to establish the monument. Id. at 1.
122 See Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1159.
123 Id. at 1160.
124 The court stated that " [t]he argument that the President cannot ask for advice, and
must personally draw lines on maps, file the necessary papers, and the other details that
are necessary to the issuance of a Presidential Proclamation in order to escape the proce-
dural requirements of NEPA approaches the absurd." Id.
125 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
126 See Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1165.
127 Id.
135320021
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1353 2001-2002
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
most of the affected lands under various other federal preservation
schemes.128
5. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus
In a second case arising out of President Carter's withdrawals in
Alaska, a copper company challenged the establishment of three im-
mense monuments:129 the Admiralty Island National Monument (1.1
million acres), the Gates of the Arctic National Monument (8.2 mil-
lion acres), and the Yukon Flats National Monument (10.6 million
acres),*13 The court declined to consider whether the monuments
were excessively large, confining itself to the narrow issue of whether
the monuments were in conformity with the Antiquities Act's objec-
tives. 131 In denying the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judg-
ment, the court stated that "[o]bviously, matters of scientific interest
which involve geological formations or which may involve plant,
animal or fish life are within this reach of the presidential authority
under the Antiquities Act."1 32 Although the court balked at the Presi-
dent's concern for solar basins and certain climatological phenom-
ena, it found that the Act protected a broad range of natural features,
including the ecosystem of plant and animal communities associated
with the Western Arctic Caribou herd. 133
Contrary to the opinion in Alaska v. Carter,'34 the Anaconda Copper
court indicated that the matter was indeed justiciable: "I do not agree
and reject the view that the only limitation upon the exercise of presi-
dential authority under [the Antiquities Act] is the paramount power
of Congress in its undoubted authority to provide for the disposition
and use of public lands. ' 13 5 Nevertheless, the court was unwilling to
limit the executive withdrawals at bar, despite its recognition that the
Antiquities Act does contain meaningful limits on the nature of the
objects and the amount of land suitable for monument status. 136 Con-
sistent with all prior decisions, the court reviewed the President's with-
drawals with deference, accepting at face value President Carter's
128 See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat.
2371 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.). For a discus-
sion of events leading up to this measure's enactment, see COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at
308; and Johannsen, supra note 74, at 453 n.112.
129 Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Alaska 1980).
The passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ultimately rendered
this case moot.
130 See 146 CONG. REc. S7031 (daily ed. July 17, 2000).
131 See Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854-55.
132 Id. at 1855.
133 See id.
134 Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1165 (D. Alaska 1978).
135 Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1853.
136 Id. at 1853-54 (noting that "[tihe outer parameters [of executive authority] have
not yet been drawn by judicial decision").
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recitations that the monuments would protect objects of historic and
scientific interest. 137
C. Congressional Ambivalence
If the presidents' generous interpretation of the Antiquities Act
resulted in landscape preservation on a scale that Congress never in-
tended, the legislators did little to protest it. Rather, over the past
century Congress has been inconsistent in its approach to the Execu-
tive's aggressive use of the Antiquities Act. Despite its occasional
harsh criticism, partisan posturing, and even occasional introduction
of bills to amend or repeal the Act, Congress has also affirmed the
presidents' withdrawals by placing monuments into protected na-
tional parks and by providing funding for the management of na-
tional monuments. 138 Moreover, with only two exceptions, the
President's monument authority has remained substantially unaltered
since its enactment in 1906.139 Examination of the century as a whole
reveals that the congressional response has been one of ambivalence
toward, or even acquiescence in, executive actions under the Antiqui-
ties Act.
1. Supporting Executive Authority
By 1906, the practice of protecting land through executive with-
drawals had been well established. Under an 1891 statute, for exam-
ple, Congress had authorized the President to withdraw lands for the
creation of forest reserves. 140 Within twenty years, presidents had pro-
tected more than 194 million acres of forest land under the authority
of the Forest Reserve Act.141 The 1906 Congress that passed the An-
tiquities Act was well aware of the Executive's aggressive use of its with-
drawal powers. 142 Nevertheless, through the Antiquities Act Congress
expanded the President's statutory withdrawal authority in terms that
are broad, discretionary, and arguably insufficient to curb the demon-
137 See id. at 1854--55.
138 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 48, at 2-3.
139 See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
140 Forest Reserve Act, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891), repealed by Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792. The
Act authorized the President to "set apart and reserve, in any State or Territory having
public land bearing forests, in any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with
timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations." Id.
141 See Getches, supra note 37, at 286; see also PAUL W. GATES, PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
COMNI'N, HIsnroRy OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 581 (1968) (offering a table of forest
reserves by states and territories as of 1909).
142 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
2002] 1355
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1355 2001-2002
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
strated presidential tendency to make generous withdrawals of
land. 43
In numerous cases, Congress has supported the President's decla-
ration of monuments by folding them into the protective national
park or national refuge systems.' 44 Although this process involves the
abolition of monuments in a technical sense, it provides a substitute
status of protection within other federal land management regimes. 1 45
More than one-half of all national parks were originally protected by
presidents as monuments.' 46 Congress also has established national
monuments itself, including vast landscapes containing unusual natu-
ral features.1 47
In other cases, Congress has provided support to presidential
monuments through subsequent legislation or funding appropria-
tions. Although President Bill Clinton's designation of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument created a firestorm of criti-
cism by some individual legislators,' 48 Congress as a whole provided
generous funding for the monument, expanded its boundaries in cer-
tain areas, and passed land-exchange legislation to facilitate its
management.49
2. Limiting Executive Authority
In several important instances, Congress has chastised the Presi-
dent for his aggressive implementation of the Antiquities Act. To in-
dicate its displeasure with the Executive, Congress has twice abolished
monuments.150 Beyond the abolition of individual monuments, Con-
143 Just nine years prior to the passage of the Antiquities Act, Congress had vacated
several forest reserves set aside by the President. See 1 CHARLES F. WHEATLEY, JR., PUBLIC
LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
LANDS 51 (rev. 1969). Although the extensive forest reserves were mentioned during de-
bate over the Antiquities Act, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, Congress neverthe-
less enacted the statute.
144 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 48, at 2-3.
145 Commentators have noted that "[m]any of the crown jewels of the national park
system were first protected by executive action under the Act, when Congress dragged its
feet." COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 307.
146 See VINCENT & BALDWIN, supra note 48, at 4.
147 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000) (listing monuments Congress has created, includ-
ing the 1 10,000-acre Mount St. Helens National Volcanic Monument).
148 See infra Part III.A.2.
"49 See Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, Nos. 2:97CV479, 2:97CV492, 2:97CV863,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15852, at *46-*47 (D. Utah Aug. 12, 1999) (discussing congressional
activity after proclamation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, but deny-
ing federal defendants' motion to dismiss based upon the theory of congressional
ratification).
150 Congress has abolished the Holy Cross and Wheeler National Monuments in Colo-
rado, seeAct of Aug. 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 648, 64 Stat. 404; Act of Aug. 3, 1950, Pub. L. No.
652, 64 Stat. 405, and the Shoshone Cavern National Monument in Wyoming, see Act of
May 17, 1954, Pub. L. No. 360, 68 Stat. 98.
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gress also has limited the President's statutory withdrawal authority.
In its strongest rebuke under the Antiquities Act, Congress reacted
adversely to President Franklin Roosevelt's establishment of the
221,610-acre Jackson Hole National Monument in Wyoming.' 51 John
D. Rockefeller, Jr. had offered to donate approximately 33,000 acres
to the federal government for park purposes. 152 In response to nearly
two decades of congressional refusal to incorporate the area into a
national park and the potential retraction of the proffered donation,
President Franklin Roosevelt unilaterally protected the land by procla-
mation in 1943.153 Congress retaliated immediately by withholding
funds for the administration of the monument. 154 One congressman
exclaimed angrily in hearings before the House Interior Committee,
"It does not seem reasonable to me that Congress ever intended that a
national monument should extend over a body of land.., nearly one-
third the size of Rhode Island."1 55 Later, Congress amended the An-
tiquities Act to prohibit the establishment of additional monuments in
the State of Wyoming and tried unsuccessfully to repeal the Antiqui-
ties Act itself'156 Despite this sharply critical response, Congress ulti-
mately protected much of the Jackson Hole monument as the Grand
Teton National Park.' 57 Thus, even in its strongest rebuke of the Pres-
151 See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
152 H.R. REP. No. 2910, at 3747 (1950).
153 See Proclamation No. 2578, 3 C.F.R. 327 (1943); see also Getches, supra note 37, at
304 (describing eighteen-year congressional impasse over expansion of Grand Teton Na-
tional Park based upon local resistance to erosion of tax base and loss of state fish and
game revenues).
154 See Getches, supra note 37, at 304.
155 Blumenthal, supra note 6 (quoting Congressman Frank Barrett, a Wyoming
Republican).
156 Act of Sept. 14, 1950, Pub. L. No. 787, 64 Stat. 849 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 431a) (banning establishment of additional monuments in Wyoming absent ex-
press congressional authorization); see Resolutions Authorizing the Comm. on Pub. Lands and
Surveys to Make a Full and Complete Investigation with Respect to the Admin. and Use of Pub.
Lands, Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Pub. Lands and Surveys, 78th Cong.
3542-43 (1943) (statement of Gus P. Backman, President, Mountain States Association)
(advocating repeal); H.R. REP. No. 2910, at 3749 (1950). At the same time, Congress
passed legislation to abolish the monument, which was defeated by presidential veto. See 2
WHEATLEY, supra note 143, at 465.
It is interesting to compare this reaction to the congressional response nearly half a
century earlier when President Theodore Roosevelt withdrew 150 million acres under the
Forest Reserve Act between 1902 and 1909. See Getches, supra note 37, at 288 & n.50.
Congress nullified the executive withdrawals and amended the Act to prohibit the creation
of new reserves in six states, unless by act of Congress. SeeAct of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34
Stat. 1256, 1271. In defiance of the congressional action, President Theodore Roosevelt
established new reserves and enlarged existing reserves (including lands within the six for-
bidden states) while the legislation was pending. See Getches, supra note 37, at 286.
157 Act of Sept. 14, 1950, Pub. L. No. 787, 64 Stat. 849 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 406d-1 to -5, 482m, 673b (2000)) (providing for abolition of monument and
reorganization into Grand Teton National Park, Teton National Forest, and National Elk
Refuge).
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ident, Congress bowed to the political reality that by mid-century, the
general public supported the preservation of lands, whether by Con-
gress or by the President.15 8
Several other presidents faced strident criticism for their use of
the Antiquities Act. In 1961, Republican President Dwight Eisen-
hower established the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Monu-
ment' 59 in defiance of a Democratic Congress that refused to protect
the 184-mile historic haul route.' 60 In retaliation, Congress blocked
funding for the monument for a decade.' 6' Today, however, the
monument remains a vital part of the Maryland landscape. 162 Nearly
twenty years later, President Jimmy Carter's reservation of millions of
acres in Alaska triggered the anger of Congress. 163 After a two-year
impasse, Congress chastised the President by limiting executive au-
thority to establish additional monuments in Alaska.' 64 At the same
time, however, Congress confirmed the Executive's preservation ef-
forts by incorporating most of the monuments into the national park
system. 165 Most recently, President Clinton's establishment of the 1.7
million acre Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument in Utah provoked
the wrath of western politicians. 166 Although several bills were intro-
duced in Congress to diminish the President's authority under the
Antiquities Act, the dispute was largely partisan, and none of the bills
was enacted into law.' 67
3. Declining to Limit Executive Authority
In several other important instances, Congress has forgone clear
opportunities to restrict presidents' authority under the Antiquities
158 See 2 WHEATLEY, supra note 143, at 465.
159 Proclamation No. 3391, reprinted in 75 Stat. 1023, 1023-25 (1961).
160 See Blumenthal, supra note 6.
161 Id
162 See 146 CONG. REc. S7031 (daily ed. July 17, 2000).
163 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
164 See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3213 (2000) (es-
tablishing that executive withdrawals exceeding five thousand acres are not effective until
notice is provided in the Federal Register and to both Houses of Congress; and that such
withdrawals terminate after one year unless approved by a joint resolution of Congress).
Reminiscing about his career, former President Carter noted, "Of all of the things that I've
done, nothing exceeds my pride in having been permitted to play a small part in the pas-
sage of... legislation [protecting Alaska lands]." Alaska Land Bills Still Debated After 20
Years, CNN.coM, Nov. 29, 2000, at http://Niv.cnn.com/2000/NATURE/11/29/
seward.alaska.reut/index.html. However, President Carter had been detested by many
Alaskans during the controversy he triggered. Id. Recalling a long past Alaska State Fair at
which one concessionaire gave the public a chance to throw balls either at a picture of
President Carter or one of the Ayatollah Khomeni of Iran, President Carter recalls, "The
fair people made a lot more money on my picture than the [A]yatollah's." Id.
165 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
166 See Blumenthal, supra note 6.
167 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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Act, but has specifically limited their withdrawal authority under other
statutes. Two such missed opportunities are particularly relevant.
First, in 1910 Congress passed the Pickett Act in response to President
William Taft's 1909 withdrawal of over three million acres of land to
protect underlying oil and gas reserves. 168 The Act provided general
authority for executive withdrawals, but limited that authority to tempo-
raiy withdrawals of land that would remain open for oil and gas devel-
opment.169 Although the Antiquities Act also had been used broadly
by that time to withdraw expansive tracts of land, Congress declined to
impose similar restrictions upon the President's establishment of na-
tional monuments in terms of acreage, duration, or purpose.170
In 1976, Congress declined to seize a second critical opportunity
to amend or repeal the Antiquities Act. In that year, Congress passed
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and expressly
repealed the executive withdrawal authority contained in twenty-nine
statutes. 17 ' The Antiquities Act is conspicuously absent from that list,
despite the recommendation of the Public Land Law Review Commis-
sion (PLLRC) that
Large scale, limited or single use withdrawals of a permanent
or indefinite term should be accomplished only by act of Congress.
All other withdrawal authority should be expressly delegated with
statutory guidelines to insure proper justification for proposed with-
drawals, provide for public participation in their consideration, and
establish criteria for executive action. 172
168 See Pickett Act, Pub. L. No. 303, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976); see also
Getches, supra note 37, at 290-91 (describing the politics behind the enactment).
169 See Getches, supra note 37, at 288 & n.51. The Pickett Act provided general with-
drawal authority to the President to supplement the more specialized withdrawal authority
for specific purposes already provided under existing statutes such as the Antiquities Act.
See Pickett Act, 36 Stat. 847 (repealed 1976).
170 By the end of 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt had set aside seventeen national
monuments encompassing over 1.5 million acres. 146 CONG. REc. S7030 (daily ed.July 17,
2000).
171 See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 and scattered sections of the U.S.
Code (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). The repeal of executive withdrawal authority is contained
in 90 Stat. 2792. Congress also enacted an express repeal of any implied delegations of
authority recognized by the courts: "Effective on and after the date of approval of this Act,
the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting from
acquiescence of the Congress (U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459) and the following
statutes and parts of statutes are repealed. .. ." Id. § 704(a).
172 See PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 9 (1970).
For a detailed argument in support of this position, see id. at 54-56; and see also 2 WHEAT-
LEY, supra note 143, at 463-65 (criticizing executive misuse of the Antiquities Act by "cir-
cumvent[ing] the requirement that only Congress can create a national park" and
describing the "overwithdrawal" that occurs when the President creates monuments "far in
excess of the amount needed to properly administer the reserved site"). The Wheatley
study was prepared under contract with the Public Land Law Review Commission (PL-
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Through its enactment of FLPMA, Congress declined to implement
the PLLRC's recommendation. Moreover, Congress expressly af-
firmed the value of executively designated national monuments by
forbidding the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking
any monuments created by executive withdrawal under the Antiqui-
ties Act. 173
In sum, although various members of Congress have vehemently
criticized executive withdrawals, Congress has imposed executive lim-
its only with respect to new monuments in Wyoming and Alaska. In
the other forty-eight states, the President's authority under the Antiq-
uities Act remains intact and vigorous.
4. Enacting Overlapping Legislation
After the passage of the 1906 Act, Congress passed a number of
statutes with preservationist goals that overlap with those of the Antiq-
uities Act. Typically, however, the later legislation contains more pre-
cise standards and procedures than does the Antiquities Act, and
includes provisions for public participation in natural resource deci-
sions.174 This overlapping legislation raises questions concerning the
legitimate sphere of executive authority under the Antiquities Act. If
Congress alone has the authority to create national parks and wilder-
ness areas, does this indicate that the President's authority to desig-
nate national monuments with wilderness-type characteristics has been
supplanted or restricted? 175 If the Secretary of the Interior has ex-
plicit authority to make emergency or other withdrawals of land that
are threatened with development, but only in limited circumstances
and pursuant to specific procedures, 176 does this preclude application
of the President's broader authority under the Antiquities Act?
Four statutes with purposes compatible with those of the Antiqui-
ties Act may render the President particularly vulnerable to allegations
LRC). 1 WHEATLEY, supra, at ii. For a thorough discussion of FLPMA, see Cetches, supra
note 37, at 313-29.
173 See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(0) (1994). Section 1714() also forbids the Secretary from
making, modifying, or revoking any congressional withdrawals. Id.
174 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 189.
175 Critics have alleged that presidents have improperly utilized the Antiquities Act to
make an "end run" around Congress by usurping the exclusive congressional prerogative
to create national parks and wilderness areas. See, e.g., Balance of Power, FLA. TIMES-UNION,
May 23, 2000, at B4 (asserting that "President Clinton has mastered the art of using execu-
tive orders, in some cases to circumvent the U.S. Constitution and Congress"); Michael
Janofsky, Amid Protests, Land-Protection Plan Goes to President, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at
A30 (noting Republican criticism that President Clinton's monument declarations consti-
tute an end run around Congress); Sean Paige, SeizingLand for Posterity?, WASH. TIMEs, Feb.
7, 2000, at 16 (reporting that opponents perceived the Clinton proclamations as "an act of
election-year pandering to the green lobby, an end-run around the legislative process and
yet another example of the federal government's high-handed ways out West").
176 See Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1994).
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of wrongdoing. First, the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916
created the National Park Service within the Department of the Inte-
rior.177 The Service, which manages national monuments, as well as
parks and reservations, has been charged with the task of managing
such federal properties "to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoy-
ment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 178 Al-
though national parks and monuments may resemble one another,
they are distinct in one important respect: only Congress can estab-
lish a national park.1 79 Critics have claimed that the President has
established various national monuments in a deliberate attempt to cir-
cumvent the congressional approval required for the creation of a
new national park.18 0
A modem statute that overlaps with the Antiquities Act is the Wil-
demess Act of 1964,181 which establishes the National Wilderness Pres-
ervation system "[i]n order to assure that an increasing population,
accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization,
does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States ....
leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their
natural condition."18 2 In general, wilderness areas must be at least
five thousand acres in size.183 Their purpose overlaps significantly
with that of national monuments: although wilderness areas should be
tracts where "the imprint of man's work [is] substantially unnotice-
able," they "may also contain ecological, geological, or other features
of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value."18 4 Wilderness ar-
eas, like national parks, can be established only by acts of Congress.1 8 5
Thus, critics have claimed that some large national monuments are
mere surrogates for wilderness preservation, illegally created by the
President without the participation of Congress.1 8 6
177 National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 235, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (2000)).
178 16 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
179 See id. § la-5(a) (directing Secretary of Interior to recommend to Congress areas
for potential inclusion in the National Park System).
180 See 2 WHEATLEY, supra note 143, at 464; sources cited supra note 175.
181 See Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1131-1136 (2000)).
182 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
183 Id. § 1131(c).
184 Id. (emphasis added).
185 See id. § 1131 (a) (providing that "no Federal lands shall be designated as 'wilder-
ness areas' except as provided for in this chapter [including provisions for congressional
involvement]").
186 See supra note 175. Indeed, such criticisms have served as the basis for allegations
of legal wrongdoings. See, e.g., Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, Nos. 2:97CV479,
2:97CV492, 2:97CV863, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15852, at *58-*67 (D. Utah Aug. 12, 1999)
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The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976187 is yet
another statute that promotes goals that overlap with the preservation
of antiquities. Among the stated goals of FLPMA are the management
of the public lands "in a manner that will protect the quality of scien-
tific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental ... and archeological
values."188 The procedural requirements of FLPMA are more detailed
than those of the Antiquities Act. Contrary to the broad scope of ex-
ecutive discretion recognized by the Antiquities Act, FLPMA orders
the Secretary of the Interior to provide for public notice and com-
ment regarding the management of the public lands,1 89 and explicitly
states that Congress holds the primary authority to withdraw and re-
serve federal lands for specific purposes.190 The statute also reserves
to Congress the final authority for the designation of wilderness areas
on public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management.' 9 '
Finally, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) 19 2 overlaps
with the Antiquities Act. The ESA protects endangered and
threatened species, in part to preserve their "esthetic, ecological, edu-
cational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and
its people."'193 Similarly, the Supreme Court has allowed the President
to use the Antiquities Act to protect certain rare species of plant or
animal life. 194 Just as both statutes may protect species for their scien-
tific and historic value, they also have been utilized to protect the eco-
systems upon which those species rely.195
Thus, at least four statutes other than the Antiquities Act explic-
itly recognize the value of protecting large landscapes for their his-
(challenging President Clinton's designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante monument
in Utah on the grounds that it unlawfully withdrew monument lands from the operation of
the mining and mineral leasing laws and exceeded executive authority by reserving lands
for wilderness purposes-powers allegedly reserved to Congress under FLPMA).
187 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); supra note 171 and accompany-
ing text.
188 Id. § 1701(a) (8) (emphasis added).
189 Id. § 1712(f).
190 See id. § 1701 (a) (4) (declaring that Congress shall "exercise its constitutional au-
thority to withdraw or otherwise designate or dedicate Federal lands for specified purposes
and that Congress [shall] delineate the extent to which the Executive may withdraw lands
without legislative action").
191 See id. § 1782(b).
192 See Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (2000)).
193 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (3) (emphasis added).
194 See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 132-33, 147 (1976) (approving implic-
itly protection of rare Devil's Hole pupfish as objects of historic or scientific interest); see
also Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1855 (D. Alaska
1980) (approving protection of Western Arctic Caribou herd and its habitat under the
Antiquities Act).
195 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (protecting critical habitat of endangered and
threatened species); Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 132-33 (protecting pupfish); Anaconda Copper, 14
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1855 (protecting caribou habitat).
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toric and scientific value. For the past century, presidents have
utilized the Antiquities Act as the most expeditious method of achiev-
ing such preservation. Although the later statutes reflect the modem
value placed upon citizen participation and the modem device of del-
egating land management duties to administrative agencies or to the
Secretary of the Interior, the Antiquities Act contains no such provi-
sions. As a result, critics have suggested that the President should
abide by the more recent-and more restrictive-legislation. 196 This
criticism raises the question of whether the Antiquities Act continues
to perform a unique and valuable function, or whether it has been
implicitly superseded, or even repealed, by modem and overlapping
legislation.197
D. Political Rhetoric
For almost a century, the courts consistently have supported
sweeping exercises of presidential authority under the Antiquities Act.
Despite this judicial support, the designation of new monuments
often has triggered angry rhetoric by critics of the President. As one
might expect, much of the criticism focuses upon the wisdom of the
Executive's policy choices-certainly an appropriate topic of political
debate. More surprisingly, the rhetoric also suggests that presidents
have acted improperly, illegally, or even unconstitutionally by with-
drawing lands under the Antiquities Act-allegations oddly divorced
from the consistentjudicial precedent to the contrary.198 Overall, po-
litical criticism advances the notion that the presidents have created
national monuments on a scale unintended by the 1906 Congress that
passed the Antiquities Act.
It is easy to overstate this point. Certainly, there are several obvi-
ous reasons why critics might choose to ignore pronouncements of
the courts. The case law is sparse and the determination of whether a
particular monument exceeds the bounds of the President's authority
involves substantial questions of fact that vary from case to case. Fur-
thermore, at times anger may trump reason, prompting those who
oppose national monuments to be concerned not with the legal nice-
ties of existing law, but rather with garnering the political support
necessary to change the law.
Nevertheless, the rhetoric is striking for its repetitiveness and its
failure to accept relevant judicial precedent. In 1920, for example,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld President Theodore Roosevelt's es-
tablishment of the Grand Canyon National Monument, deferring to
196 See, e.g., infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
197 See discussion infra Part III.B (suggesting an ongoing role for the Antiquities Act,
despite the subsequent passage of overlapping legislation).
198 See supra Part I.B.
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the President's proclamation that the area embraced objects of his-
toric or scientific interest. 199 Over three-quarters of a century later,
litigants continued to challenge the President's discretion in protect-
ing large land areas, refusing to accept the findings expressed by pres-
idential proclamation. One critic of President Clinton's creation of
the 1.7 million acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
asked the court to invalidate a similar presidential proclamation based
on the allegation that the area may contain no prehistoric relics:200
Apparently believing that saying it makes it so, President Clinton's
proclamation contained all the requisite words of the Antiquities
Act, including "scientific," "historic," and "the smallest area compat-
ible." Whether saying it makes it so, even for presidents, and
whether words on paper make up for what is not on the ground,
remains to be seen .... 201
Similarly, a 1997 lawsuit alleges that the process establishing the
Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument exceeded the scope of the Presi-
dent's delegated authority, that it violated NEPA,20 2 that the Presi-
dent's motives were improper, and that the monument was excessive
in size.203 In similar circumstances, lower federal courts have previ-
ously disposed of similar claims in favor of the President, holding that
NEPA does not apply to the President,20 4 that the President's motives
are irrelevant,20 5 and that even monuments over ten million acres in
size may be acceptable provided that they serve historic and scientific
purposes.20 6 It seems as though the general public has not heard the
message of the courts.
This perplexing situation may be a consequence of the courts'
uncertainty as to the scope of their jurisdiction to review presidents'
discretionary withdrawals under the Antiquities Act. Based upon their
respect for the office of the President (and perhaps upon the Antiqui-
199 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920). For a discussion of Cam-
eron, see supra Part I.B.1.
200 Pendley, supra note 12, at 15 (discussing an action filed by the Mountain States
Legal Foundation, of which Pendley is President and Chief Legal Officer).
201 Id. at 8.
202 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
203 Plaintiff's Complaint at 23-26, 32-34, Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, No.
2:97CV-0479B (D. Utah filedJuly 31, 1997); see also Pendley, supra note 12, at 14 (contend-
ing that President Clinton's establishment of the monument was a "ruse" to preserve wil-
derness, and that the President may have violated NEPA); Neil A. Lewis, House Tweaks
Clinton over Creation of National Monuments, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at A16 (citing Repre-
sentative James V. Hansen of Utah for the claim that "Mr. Clinton had abused his authority
when he created the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah without in-
forming the local members of Congress or the Governor").
204 Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (D. Alaska. 1978).
205 Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945).
206 See Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1854 (D.
Alaska 1980).
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ties Act's failure to incorporate an explicit private right of action),
courts have deferred to the executives and disposed of claims against
them. Ironically, this judicial respect for presidents may have pro-
moted a concomitant disrespect among the general population. As
one commentator has observed:
There are ... reasons why it would be unwise to treat the President's
statutory duties as political questions.... [T] he President would
lose an important means of defending the legitimacy of his actions.
Ajudicial determination that executive action is consistent with stat-
utory authority enables a President to blunt charges that he has
overstepped his role in defiance of the institutional interests of
Congress.207
Thus, the courts' reluctance to second-guess executive authority-
whether expressed as deference or as a limited jurisdiction-opens
the door for critics to assert that the President has transgressed the
law. If the President is unable to vindicate himself in the courts of law,
then the court of public opinion will remain actively critical.
II
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: NATURE AS
ISOLATED CONSTRUCT
One great irony of history is that civilized societies have trans-
formed nature into an unnatural philosophical construct.208 This "na-
ture" has been both despised and revered, viewed simultaneously as
an obstacle to be conquered and as a reflection of a divine presence.
In both cases, nature is the antithesis of civilization, a living force dis-
tinct and apart from human society. This Part observes that resistance
to the designation of large national monuments may be rooted in the
historical and philosophical dichotomy between natural and human
systems. Through the Antiquities Act-as well as the Wilderness Act,
the Endangered Species Act, and other legislation-Congress has pro-
moted the often-unworkable legal fiction that humans and nature can
remain separate from one another. This illusion may have harmful,
unintended consequences, diverting dialogue from difficult, subjec-
tive decisions about the proper use of our wild lands. In many in-
stances, the degree of legal protection afforded a landscape is
inversely proportional to the amount of human disturbance that can
be detected on it.209 Under the Antiquities Act, however, the opposite
207 Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REv. 1,
9-10 (1982).
208 SeeJonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Conse-
quences, 22 EcoLoGY L.Q. 325, 348 (1995) (book review) (asserting that "the very concept
of 'nature' is not 'natural' but is a human construct").
209 See infra Part II.B.2.
136520021
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1365 2001-2002
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
is true: a landscape may not be entitled to protection unless it has
been prominently marked by a human presence.210 In either case,
current statutory schemes rely, perhaps excessively, upon rigid objec-
tive markers-such as whether an area contains archaeological ruins,
roads, or wild animals that have been touched by humans-to answer
difficult questions about the protection of large landscapes and eco-
logical systems.211
A. The Philosophical Dichotomy Between Nature and Culture
Scientists have long struggled against the drive to separate
humans from natural systems. As early as 150 A.D., astronomer Ptol-
emy of Alexandria developed an elaborate geocentric model of the
universe in which the moon, sun, and planets revolved around the
earth. 212 The Catholic Church embraced the Ptolemaic system, which
served as a useful scientific counterpart to the Church's belief in the
supremacy of humans over all creation. 213 Both philosophies sup-
ported the vision of man as center and raison detre of the universe,
rather than merely one member of the complex ecosystems of the
earth. When Galileo Galilei postulated in 1632 that the sun rather
than the earth may be the center of the universe, the Church put him
on trial for heresy.21 4 Thus, Galileo's theory represented an early
challenge to the assumption of civilized societies that humans are in a
hierarchical position above and apart from nature.
Over two hundred years later, another major scientific theory met
with resistance for linking humans to other forms of life.215 Charles
Darwin proposed his theory of natural selection, contending that ex-
isting species of plants and animals have their origin in preexisting
types that have modified from one generation to the next.21 6 The
210 See infra Part II.B.4.
211 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2000) (defining wilderness as "an area of underdevel-
oped.., land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improve-
ments or human habitation").
212 HAL HELLMAN, GREAT FEUDS IN SCIENCE 7 (1998).
213 See id. at 8. Hellman notes that the Bible contains numerous astronomical refer-
ences with which the Ptolemaic view is consistent. For example, Psalm 93 proclaims, "Yea,
the world is established; it shall never be moved." Id. (quoting Psalm 93:1 (Revised Standard
Version)) (emphasis in original).
214 Id. at 2-3. Galileo was not the first to propose a heliocentric model. See id. at 6-9
(discussing the contributions of Aristarchus, Nicolaus Copernicus, and Johannes Kepler).
215 See id. at 81 (describing public reaction to Darwin's theory of natural selection). See
generallyJ. BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 291-309 (1973) (discussing Darwin's work in a
chapter entitled "The Ladder of Creation").
216 CHARLES DARWIN, THE OIGIN OF SPECIES 69 (J.W. Burrow ed., Penguin Books
1985) (1859). Darwin described natural selection as follows:
Let it be borne in mind how infinitely complex and close-fitting are the
mutual relations of all organic beings to each other and to their physical
conditions of life. Can it, then, be thought improbable, seeing that varia-
tions useful to man have undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful
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potential application of Danvin's theory to humans raised vehement
opposition for its suggestion that humans evolved from lower forms of
life.2 17 As the bishop of Oxford, Samuel Wilberforce, reportedly ar-
gued in 1860:
Man's derived supremacy over the earth; man's power of articulate
speech; man's gift of reason; man's freewill [sic] and responsibility;
man's fall and man's redemption; the incarnation of the Eternal
Son; the indwelling of the Eternal Spirit,-all are equally and utterly
irreconcilable with the degrading notion of the brute origin of him
who was created in the image of God.218
In the early twentieth century, anti-evolutionary forces intensified.21 9
By the early 1920s, the teaching of evolution had been banned in Ten-
nessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas. 220 Later that decade, John Thomas
Scopes was convicted of teaching evolutionary theory to public school
students in violation of Tennessee law.221 Although the Supreme
Court of Tennessee ultimately reversed the conviction, it upheld the
state statute that criminalized the teaching of evolution in Tennessee
public schools. 222 Thus, the intellectual isolation of humans from na-
ture received the imprimatur of the law during roughly the same pe-
riod in which the Antiquities Act was drafted, enacted by Congress,
and first utilized by President Theodore Roosevelt.2 23
1. Culture: Tamed Landscapes
The philosophical dichotomy between nature and culture is also
evident in the historical narratives that portray nature as a force that
humans must conquer. The drive to conquer nature has been infused
with religious overtones. An often-quoted passage of the Bible de-
clares that man shall have "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over
in some way to each being in the great and complex battle of life, should
sometimes occur in the course of thousands of generations? If such do
occur, can we doubt (remembering that many more individuals are born
than can possibly survive) that individuals having any advantage, however
slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreat-
ing their kind?... This preservation of favourable variations and the rejec-
tion of injurious variations, I call Natural Selection.
Id. at 130-31.
217 ERNST MAYR, ONE LONG ARGUMENT: CHARLES DARWIN AND THE GENESIS OF MODERN
EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT 25 (1991) ("[N]o Danvinian idea was less acceptable to the
Victorians than the derivation of man from a primitive ancestor.... The primate origin of
man... immediately raised questions about the origin of mind and consciousness that are
controversial to this day.").
218 RONALD W. CLARK, THE SURVIVAL OF CHARLES DARWIN 145 (1984).
219 HFutaNAN, supra note 212, at 92-96.
220 RONALD L. NUMBERS, THE CREATIONIsTS 41 (1992).
221 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (Tenn. 1927); see also HELLMAN, supra note 212, at
94-96 (describingJohn Thomas Scopes's trial).
222 Scopes, 289 S.W. at 364-67.
223 See supra Part IA.
2002] 1367
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1367 2001-2002
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over
every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. '224
That biblical authority took on new life during the drive to settle
the western United States in the mid-nineteenth century. A spirit of
"manifest destiny" seized the nation in its effort to conquer and ac-
quire title to the vast territory stretching from coast to coast. As jour-
nalist John O'Sullivan wrote in 1845,
Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of rights of discovery, explo-
ration, settlement, contiguity, etc ..... The American claim is by
the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the
whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the devel-
opment of the great experiment of liberty and federative self-gov-
ernment entrusted to us. It is a right such as that of the tree to the
space of air and earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle
and destiny of growth. 225
In 1887, W.M. Thayer used a similar metaphor of conquest to describe
the cultivation of the seemingly endless cornfields of Kansas and
wheat fields of Dakota. This time, the force to be conquered was na-
ture itself:
[A] farm of twenty or thirty thousand acres... is divided into sec-
tions, with superintendent and army of employees for each section,
who go to work with military precision and order. The... workers
... [move] forward like a column of cavalry, turning over a hun-
dred acres of soil in an incredibly brief period of time.... Under
this arrangement the earth is easily conquered by this mighty army of
ploughers, who move forward to the music of rattling machines and
the tramp of horses. It is an inspiring spectacle,-the almost
boundless prairie farm and the cohorts of hopeful tillers marching
over it in triumph.
... It seems as if God had concentrated His wisdom and power
upon this part of our country, to make it His crowning work of mod-
ern civilization on this Western Continent. For its history is Provi-
dence illustrated,-God in the affairs of men to exhibit the
grandeur of human enterprise and the glory of human
achievement. 22 6
Thus, the rhetoric of divinely-sanctioned conquest accompanied both
the acquisition and domestication of the national territory.
American literature and art of the era likewise portray the con-
quest of nature as a handmaiden of civilization. In an 1881 poem in
praise of pioneers, Walt Whitman declared:
224 Genesis 1:26 (KingJames).
225 RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF My OWN": A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 73 (1991) (emphasis added).
226 WILLAM M. THAYER, MARVELS OF THE NEW WEST 637, 710 (1887) (emphasis added).
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All the past we leave behind,
We debouch upon a newer mightier world, varied world,
Fresh and strong the world we seize, world of labor and the march,
Pioneers! 0 pioneers!
We primeval forests felling,
We the rivers stemming, vexing we and piercing deep the mines
within,
We the surface broad surveying, we the virgin soil upheaving,
Pioneers! 0 pioneers! 227
Early American visual art favored the depiction of domesticated na-
ture rather than uncultivated scenery.2 28 It was not until the early
nineteenth century that "a few connoisseurs began to regard the
American landscape as either a 'noble' subject or one of sufficient
'grandeur' to make it worth the painting."2 29 Prior to that time, "no-
body. . . felt the need for pictures showing the uncouth state of the
[American] countryside." 230 Rather, comparatively tame views of for-
mal parks and gardens were preferred.23 '
2. Nature: Untamed Wilderness
In contrast to those who have viewed nature as simply a force to
be conquered, others have perceived wilderness as an object to be re-
vered and protected from human interference. From both perspec-
tives, however, civilization remains distinct and apart from the natural
environment. The bold explorer may venture into the wilderness, re-
turning in victory and laden with the bounty of nature. The awestruck
poet or artist may spend the day outdoors seeking an inspiration that
can be transformed through human artifice into an object of human
culture. At the end of the day, however, both conqueror and artist
retreat to the familiar comforts of hearth and home and civilization.
The so-called Hudson River School of the nineteenth century
presents a clear example of the growing reverence for wilderness scen-
ery. Artists such as Thomas Cole painted dramatic scenes of the
American wilderness, departing from "landscape painting tradition by
either omitting any sign of man and his works or reducing the [pro-
portions of] human figures."23 2 These artists struggled against the at-
titude that untamed landscapes were unworthy of artistic treatment.233
227 WALT WHrrMAN, Pioneers! 0 Pioneers!, in LEAvES OF GRASS 194, 194-95 (Emory Hol-
lovay ed., Doubleday & Co. 1954) (1881).
228 See HANS HuTH, NATURE AND THE AMERICAN 40-41 (1957).
229 Id. at 41.
230 Id. at 40 (describing attitudes of the seventeenth century).
231 Ide
232 RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 79 (1967).
233 See HutH, supra note 228, at 50.
20021 1369
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1369 2001-2002
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
American landscape artists in the nineteenth century faced the
same brand of criticism that later was leveled at presidents who pro-
tected large landscapes under the Antiquities Act. Cole and his fol-
lowers devoted themselves to refuting the notion that "American
scenery possessed little that is interesting or truly beautiful, and that
being destitute of the vestige of antiquity it may not be compared with
European scenery."234 On the contrary, Cole maintained, the "sub-
limity of untamed wilderness and the majesty of the eternal moun-
tains" made the American landscape a worthy artistic subject. 235
Indeed, by the early 1800s the public had begun to appreciate scenery
that was "wild, romantic and awful,"23 6 allowing depictions of such
scenery to take their place beside those of cultivated landscapes. Less
than one hundred years later, presidents would demonstrate much
the same spirit by attempting to protect under the Antiquities Act
both immense natural features and modest prehistoric ruins.
Some nineteenth century American writers and philosophers
shared the view that nature should be insulated and protected from
human exploitation. In his 1864 book Man and Nature, George Per-
kins Marsh argued that natural resources should be conserved and
that nature should be respected for its aesthetic, scientific, and spiri-
tual values. 237 Echoing this theme, Frederick Law Olmsted worked for
the protection of special landscapes. 238 His efforts set the stage for
the establishment of Yosemite National Park.2 39 Contemplating a
strong human presence, Congress set aside the land "for public use,
resort and recreation." 240 Nonetheless, the dominant goal was the
preservation of the Yosemite Valley, which was to be held in protective
public management "inalienable for all time."241
B. Importing the Dichotomy into Law
Like other disciplines, the field of law has been influenced by the
distinction between nature and culture. Lawmakers have struggled to
define the appropriate role of nature in a civilized society, maintain-
ing the view that nature and culture are separate. The practice of
labeling all things natural as somehow uncivilized appeared as early as
234 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting a lecture Cole delivered in 1831 at the American
Lyceum in New York City).
235 See id.
236 See id. at 44 (quoting an 1816 speech by New York Governor De Witt Clinton, an
active promoter of the American Academy of the Fine Arts).
237 GEORGE PERINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (David Lowenthal ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 1965) (1864). See generally HuTH, supra note 228, at 192-93 (discussing Marsh's book
and subsequent changes in society's attitude toward nature).
238 See NAsH, supra note 232, at 106.
239 See id.
240 Act ofJune 30, 1864, ch. 184, § 1, 13 Stat. 325, 325.
241 Id
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1823 in the decision of Johnson v. M'Intosh.242 Chief Justice Marshall
regarded with suspicion the Piankeshaw Indians' harmonious rela-
tionship with nature: "But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence
was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness .... -243 The
Court declined to treat the tribes as truly civilized societies with title to
their territory, in part because there was no clear demarcation be-
tween their culture and wild nature.244 Instead, the Court adopted
the fiction that tribal lands were unoccupied and that "discovery" of
these lands conferred title upon the European explorers.245
1. Conservation and Preservation
Over time, the philosophical norms regulating the interface be-
tween nature and culture led to a disparate collection of natural re-
source laws. By the dawn of the twentieth century-the era that
spawned the Antiquities Act-two dominant natural resource philoso-
phies had emerged: conservation and preservation. Both were reac-
tions against the unrestrained exploitation of natural resources
spurred by the industrial revolution and the coast-to-coast settlement
of the continent. Although both resource philosophies share the
laudable goal of protecting the natural environment, each advances
the simplism that nature and culture are two distinct entities.
The first resource philosophy-conservation-found its roots in
the ideology of conquest.246 Inspired by the work of scientist-lawyer
George Perkins Marsh, conservationists embraced scientific manage-
ment principles that would lead to efficient and sustainable use of nat-
ural resources. 247 Their belief that the public lands should remain
under federal management and ownership was promoted by the pas-
sage of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which authorized the President
to "set apart and reserve... any part of the public lands wholly or in
242 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
243 Id. at 590.
244 See id. (describing the Piankeshaw as "a people with whom it was impossible to mix,
and who could not be governed as a distinct society").
245 See id. at 573 (describing the discovery principle under which "discovery gave title
to the government by whose subjects... it was made, against all other European govern-
ments, which title might be consummated by possession").
246 See supra Part II.A.1.
247 See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
31-33 (3d ed. 1999); see also MARsH, supra note 237, at 36 (asserting that "[m]an has too
long forgotten that the earth was given to him for usufruct alone, not for consumption, still
less for profligate waste").
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part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial
value or not, as public reservations. '" 248
In an action that would presage his protection of immense tracts
of land under the Antiquities Act,249 President Theodore Roosevelt
withdrew approximately 150 million acres under the General Revision
Act for the establishment of forest reservations. 250 President Theo-
dore Roosevelt was assisted in this endeavor by Gifford Pinchot, who
was appointed in 1905 as Chief Forester of the newly created U.S. For-
est Service. 251 Pinchot proceeded from the premise that "[a]ll of the
resources of forest reserves are for use ... where conflicting interests
must be reconciled, the question will always be decided from the
standpoint of the greatest good for the greatest number in the long
run."252 Similarly, the Forest Service's organic act provides that "[n] o
national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the
forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of tim-
ber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States. 253
Thus, although the Forest Service is the quintessential example of a
modem, protective federal agency, its conservation mission reflects
the historical philosophy that nature should be isolated and tamed for
the benefit of humans.
The second major resource philosophy-preservation-is a natu-
ral outgrowth of the view that wild nature should be revered and pro-
tected from the impact of humans. 254 Drawing upon the work of
writers such as Sierra Club founder John Muir, preservationists
worked to set aside federal lands for the protection of "wild
beauty. '25 5 The National Park System, described as the "first modem
category of public lands,"25 6 represents the archetypal expression of
the preservationist philosophy. Despite Congress's earlier creation of
individual parks during the nineteenth century, the National Park Ser-
vice was not formally chartered until the passage of its organic act in
248 Forest Reserve Act, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103, repealed by Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792. Under that
statute, the Executive reserved millions of acres of federal land for protective management.
COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 107 (describing reservations for national park and na-
tional forest purposes). The Organic Act of 1897 authorized federal management of these
forest reserves. Act ofJune 4, 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Star. 11, 34-36 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (2000)).
249 See supra Part I.A.
250 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 107.
251 See id.; NASH, supra note 232, at 163.
252 Harold W. Wood, Jr., Pinchot and Mather: How the Forest Service and Park Service Got
That Way, NOT MAN APART, Dec. 1976, at 1, 1.
253 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000) (emphasis added).
254 See supra Part I.A.2.
255 EDWIN WAY TEALE, THE WiLDRNESS WORLD OFJOHN MUIR, at xix (1954).
256 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 116.
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1916.257 That legislation articulates a coherent rationale for the
parks, describing their purpose as the preservation of scenery, wildlife,
and historic objects for future generations. 258 The Park Service is the
agency that manages most national monuments. 259
More recently, the Wilderness Act of 1964260 provides for the des-
ignation of wilderness areas, lands in which the impacts of humans are
minimized even more than in national parks. The statute authorizes
the reservation as wilderness of large tracts of land that are "untram-
meled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not re-
main."261 After reservation, wilderness areas must be preserved and
protected "for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such
manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment
as wilderness." 262
In sum, both conservationist and preservationist laws promote the
perception that nature and culture are two distinct entities, and that
the philosophical demarcation between the two can be translated into
actual, physical boundary lines. At times, this premise has created
confusion and disagreement. For example, preservationist statutes
such as the Wilderness Act and the Endangered Species Act disqualify
human-tainted landscapes from protection, an exclusion that often
seems arbitrary.263 In contrast, conservationist laws may achieve the
opposite result. The Antiquities Act illustrates this second phenome-
non, interpreted by some to preclude legal protection for large, natu-
ral areas. When presidents have designated large tracts of land as
monuments, critics have reacted with outrage. 264 The philosophical
fuel for this anger may be the implicit assumption that the Antiquities
Act is a conservationist law designed to protect only the remnants of
human society and to preserve them for human use and scientific
study. Under this view, aggressive executive use of the Act violates the
longstanding social understanding that nature and society should be
kept distinct in our thoughts and in our laws.
257 National Park Service Organic Act, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (2000).
258 See 16 U.S.C. § 1.
259 See id. § 2. President Clinton deviated from past practice by placing monuments
under the management of the Bureau of Land Management instead of the National Park
Service. See David Williams, Planning the BLM's First National Monument, 21 J. LAND RE-
SOURCES & ENvrL. L. 543, 543 (2001).
260 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2000).
261 Id. § 1131 (c).
262 I& § 1131(a).
263 See infra Parts II.B.2, II.B.3.
264 See supra Part I.D.
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2. The Wilderness Act
But does the fact of human contact make nature any less worth protecting?
If we learned that all the world's forests, even dense jungle, were merely
regrowth after ancient human habitation, would that lead us to abandon
them to deforestation? Faced with such facts, the categorical [separation of
human action from nature] would offer no reason for conserving forests or
wilderness; and yet abdication cannot be the answer.2 65
The Wilderness Act of 1964266 is perhaps the best legislative mani-
festation of the impulse to divide the world into the mutually exclusive
spheres of nature and culture. The legislation embodies the philoso-
phy that wild nature is to be revered and protected from human influ-
ence. As a corollary, however, the statute suggests that lands touched
by humans have been tainted and rendered ineligible for special pro-
tection. In practice, the theoretical line between wild and civilized
territory might be difficult, if not impossible, to draw. To facilitate
such line-drawing, Congress chose roads as the emblem of civilization
and instructed federal agencies to study only "roadless" areas as poten-
tial candidates for wilderness status. 267 At times this formalistic dis-
tinction has yielded absurd results. In a few extreme cases, counties
have raced to grade roads into wilderness study areas in order to pre-
clude the federal government from designating them as wilderness. 268
As a result, sensitive lands have been unnecessarily degraded, a conse-
quence probably not desired by either the federal or county parties.
In the Act, Congress specifically defined "wilderness" in terms
that exclude all traces of human society. 269 Congress emphasized that
wilderness areas are those which "generally appear[ I] to have been
affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's
work substantially unnoticeable. ' ' 270 A book published by the U.S. For-
est Service in 1978 distinguished between this narrow, statutory view
of "legal wilderness" and the broader territory of "sociological wilder-
ness" that might include "any relatively undeveloped wildland, uncut
forest, or woodlot."271 The Forest Service observed that the legal defi-
nition "places wilderness on the 'untrammeled' or 'primeval' portion
of the environmental modification spectrum."272
265 Wiener, supra note 208, at 347.
266 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136.
267 See infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text.
268 See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
269 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c); see supra text accompanying note 261.
270 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
271 JOHN C. HENDEE ET AL., WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT 4 (2d ed. 1990). The Forest
Service noted that "[a] t the other extreme [from legal wilderness, sociological wilderness]
is whatever people think it is, potentially the entire universe, the terra incognita of people's
minds." Id.
272 Id.
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Prior to the passage of the Wilderness Act, wild areas were pro-
tected administratively by federal agencies. As early as 1924, the For-
est Service had set aside 700,000 acres in the Gila National Forest of
New Mexico as wilderness.273 The agency placed additional lands into
protective categories such as "wild," "canoe," or "primitive."274 Con-
gress itself designated several more protected areas under legislation
requiring the land to be managed as "primitive."275 In general, the
distinguishing feature of these early wilderness areas was the absence
of roads and motorized vehicles. 276
Through the Wilderness Act, Congress sanctioned the practice of
using roads as a proxy for civilization, thereby giving roads a symbolic
as well as practical function in delineating the separate spheres of na-
ture and culture. The Act originally designated some nine million
acres as official wilderness, thereby permanently protecting areas pre-
viously classified by the Forest Service as "wilderness," "wild," or "ca-
noe."277  In addition, the statute established wilderness study
programs for the potential expansion of the system.278 The study ar-
eas focused primarily upon large roadless tracts, including national
forest areas previously classified as "primitive,"279 as well as roadless
areas of at least five thousand contiguous acres in the national park
system, national wildlife refuges, and game ranges.280 In 1967, the
Forest Service began a comprehensive study of additional roadless ar-
eas, well beyond those study areas mandated by the Wilderness Act.28 '
In 1976, yet more roadless lands came under study as potential wilder-
ness under FLPMA, which required the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) to "review those roadless areas of five thousand acres or more
and roadless islands of the public lands, identified... as having wil-
derness characteristics described in the Wilderness Act."28 2
273 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 1012-13 (noting the influential role of Aldo Leo-
pold in convincing the agency to set aside the land).
274 See id. at 1014.
275 Id. at 1013 (citing as an example Congress's 1930 designation of a portion of the
Superior National Forest in Minnesota for maintenance "in an unmodified state of
nature").
276 See id.
277 See 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000); COGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 1014.
278 See 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b)-(c).
279 Id. § 1132(b).
280 Id. § 1132(c).
281 See COGGINS Er Ai.., supra note 19, at 1040-41 (describing two phases of Roadless
Area Review and Evaluation, which came to be known as RARE I and RARE II).
282 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 603(a), 90
Stat. 2743, 2785 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1994)). Noting the substan-
tial delay in establishing a wilderness study program for lands managed by the BLM, Cog-
gins and his coauthors ironically observed: "To prove that neither conservationists nor
Congress had yet learned all of the lessons of history, the [Wilderness] Act did not ex-
pressly deal with the single largest block of federal lands, those managed by the BLM."
COGGINS Er AL., supra note 19, at 1015.
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As wilderness legislation established roads as a metaphor for cul-
ture, roadless areas became the symbol of wilderness. Significant con-
sequences flow from this rigid distinction. In general, wilderness
designation effectively enjoins the construction of permanent or tem-
porary roads, commercial enterprises, or structures, and it forbids the
use of motorized vehicles or equipment. 283 It also limits mining and
prospecting activities. 284 Similarly, BLM wilderness study areas are
generally managed under a "nonimpairment" standard that prevents
"unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their
resources."
285
This arbitrary, albeit expedient, categorization of lands as either
"roadless" or "roaded" is perhaps an inadequate means of distinguish-
ing lands that are worthy of special protection from those that are
not.286 In some cases, even the slightest human imprint may disqual-
ify lands otherwise deserving of wilderness status. For example, the
Forest Service initially followed the policy that "any trace of man's ac-
tivity" precluded management as wilderness. 28 7 Accordingly, the Ser-
vice argued in an early case that a wild, "thickly wooded, secluded and
unspoiled" area should be disqualified from wilderness status due to
the presence of an overgrown and barely noticeable "bug" road that
had been constructed some twenty years earlier to control infestation
by the bark beele.288 The Forest Service ultimately abandoned this
narrow interpretation and adopted a more generous view of
wilderness. 289
The decades-long dispute over wilderness designation in Utah
serves as an illustration of how the formalistic distinction between na-
ture and culture is prone to abuse and manipulation. Pursuant to
FLPMA,290 in 1979 the BLM began an inventory of all its lands in Utah
for potential inclusion in the wilderness system.291 Ultimately, the
283 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). The section contains a grandfather clause protecting "existing
private rights." Id. In addition, it creates certain exemptions for health, safety, and admin-
istrative purposes. Id.
284 Id. § 1133(d) (2)-(3).
285 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). See generally Justin James Quigley, Grand Staircase-Esalante Na-
tional Monument: Preservation or Politics ?, 19J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 55, 62-66 (1999)
(discussing interim management of wilderness study areas).
286 Some writers have called for an expansion of the legal definition of wilderness to
include lands that bear a human imprint. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & George Cam-
eron Coggins, Wilderness in Context, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 383, 395-400 (1999). Professors
Glicksman and Coggins argue that "[t] he notion of reclaiming nature or recreating wilder-
ness is not a pipe dream." Id. at 397. "If development turns out to be mistaken," they
explain, "corrective measures sometimes can and should be taken." Id. (discussing the
possibility of selectively removing dams and roads).
287 H.R. REP. No. 95-540, at 5 (1977); see COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 1039.
288 Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593, 594-96 (D. Colo. 1970).
289 See H.R. REP. No. 95-540, at 4-6; COGGINS ET AL., supra note 19, at 1039.
290 43 U.S.C. § 1782.
291 Quigley, supra note 285, at 67-68.
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agency designated 3.2 million acres as wilderness study areas for possi-
ble designation as wilderness. 29 2 In its final environmental impact
statement, the BLM recommended the designation of 1.9 million
acres of wilderness, an amount which then-Interior Secretary Manuel
Lujan adopted in his 1991 recommendation to Congress.293 Due to
political controversy, however, Congress failed to act upon the
recommendation. 294
Frustrated by the slow progress of final wilderness designations,
the succeeding President and Secretary of the Interior intervened,
prompting an angry response from state and local wilderness oppo-
nents. Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt argued for the designation of
at least five million acres as wilderness. 295 In response to a heated
challenge by Utah Representative James Hansen, Babbitt initiated a
"reinventory" of Utah's BLM lands in July 1996 to support his propo-
sal.296 Soon afterward, on September 18, 1996, President Clinton es-
tablished the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument on 1.7
million acres of land in southern Utah.297
The vulnerability of a protection system that focuses in large part
upon the presence or absence of roads has not been overlooked by
opponents of the wilderness system. In protest of President Clinton's
aggressive preservation efforts, Utah counties took actions designed to
make lands ineligible for wilderness status. In Kane County, for exam-
ple, officials graded over five hundred miles of backcountry roads in
an acknowledged attempt to thwart their designation as wilderness. 29s
Noting that wilderness cannot be established in areas containing
mechanically maintained roads, one county commissioner stated:
What we said was, if [Babbitt's reinventory team is] having trouble
judging if it's a road, we are going to brighten those roads up ....
We went out and reestablished our roads. We smoothed them out.
Then they can't say it wasn't graded or it wasn't maintained. It was
to help them with their judgment.299
292 See id. The BLM increased its initial designation of 2.5 million acres as wilderness
study areas to just over 3.2 million acres after an administrative appeal. See id.
293 Id. at 68-69.
294 Id. at 69.
295 Id. at 72.
296 See id. at 72-73. In 1998, the Tenth Circuit dismissed for lack of standing a chal-
lenge to the Secretary's authority to conduct the reinventory, and vacated the trial court's
preliminary injunction of the reinventory. Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.
1998). Secretary Babbitt completed his reinventory in 1999 with a report calling for a total
of 5.8 million acres of designated wilderness. Quigley, supra note 285, at 76.
297 Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 24, 1996).
298 Tom Kenworthy, Blazing Utah Trails to Block a Washington Monument, WASH. POST,
Nov. 30, 1996, at Al.
299 Id. (quoting Kane County Commissioner Joe C. Judd); see also Jim Woolf, Fewer
Bumps on the Back Roads, SALT LAKE TRm., Aug. 24, 1996, at BI (quoting Southern Utah
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Local officials elsewhere in southern Utah followed suit, bringing
heavy road grading equipment to hundreds of additional miles of re-
mote jeep trails.300
In a highly publicized expression of support for the Utah coun-
ties, wilderness protesters in Nevada organized the so-called Jarbidge
Shovel Brigade on the Fourth of July 2000.301 The brigade rebuilt a
Forest Service road near Jarbidge, Nevada that had been closed to
protect the endangered bull trout.30 2 The Nevada protesters awarded
neighboring Governor Mike Leavitt of Utah the "Golden Shovel
Award" in recognition of his fight to exert local control over roads on
federal lands.30 3 Recognizing the larger message implicit in the pro-
test, the Salt Lake Tribune observed, "the Jarbidge road-opening event
... has come to symbolize the resurgent rebellion by rural Westerners
against an allegedly tyrannical federal land-management
bureaucracy. '"304
In sum, the deliberate destruction of wild areas in Utah and Ne-
vada illustrates the perverse, unintended consequences of legislation
such as the Wilderness Act that relies upon a rigid, unrealistic dichot-
omy between nature and civilization. Admittedly, any scheme of land
protection entails difficult and highly charged political choices. How-
ever, the inflexible nature-culture distinction employed by the Wilder-
ness Act threatens to transform thoughtful discussions about the best
use of a tract of land into a trivial search for roads and other indicia of
a human presence that can disqualify federal lands from wilderness
protection.
3. The Endangered Species Act
The ESA,305 like the Wilderness Act, illustrates the reluctance to
acknowledge that nature and culture are interrelated. Provisions of
its reintroduction scheme rest on the assumption that purely wild ani-
mals remain wholly apart from animals that humans have transported
to new geographic sites.30 6 Furthermore, the ESA presumes that the
two populations can be distinguished readily, even though they are of
Wilderness Alliance Director Ken Rait, who refers to the road grading work as "bulldozer
vigilantism").
300 Kenworthy, supra note 298.
301 Brent Israelsen, Governor Given Shovel by Nevada Road Protesters, SALT LAKE TRiB.,
Aug. 26, 2000, at B3.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); see supra notes
192-93 and accompanying text.
306 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539 0) (1) (defining reintroduced populations as those "wholly sep-
arate geographically" from natural populations).
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the very same species.307 Once tainted by human intrusion, so-called
"experimental populations" lose many of the protections afforded to
their wilder counterparts, creating a dichotomy reminiscent of the
one between roadless and roaded areas maintained under the Wilder-
ness Act.308 As illustrated by the gray wolf reintroduction program,
absurd results might occur when reality confronts the legal fiction that
reintroduced populations are distinct from naturally occurring
populations.30 9
Under section 100) of the ESA, designated federal agencies may
transport endangered or threatened species for release outside their
current range to further the conservation of the species.310 As distin-
guished from naturally occurring populations, these transplanted ani-
mals are deemed "experimental populations" as long as they remain
"wholly separate geographically from nonexperimental populations of
the same species. '31 Consistent with the long tradition of sacrificing
"tamed nature" for the service of human needs, 312 experimental
populations may lose a significant measure of legal protection upon
reintroduction. In particular, they are treated as "threatened" rather
than "endangered."313 As a result, § 9's prohibition against the "tak-
ing" of species may be relaxed.314 Thus, in certain circumstances,
members of a reintroduced population may be harmed or even
killed.315 For example, the regulations that govern the gray wolf rein-
307 Id.
308 See id. § 1539() (2) (c) (generally reducing protection of reintroduced endangered
species to the level accorded "threatened" species).
309 See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
310 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(A).
311 See id. § 1539(j) (1). For a thorough discussion of the reintroduction provisions
and their legislative history, see Federico Cheever, From Population Segregation to Species Zon-
ing: The Evolution of Reintroduction Law Under Section 10() of the Endangered Species Act 1
Wyo. L. Rxv. 287 (2001). Arguing that the "wholly separate geographically" requirement
arose from Congress's flawed perception that nature remains static, Professor Cheever
notes that although "species populations do surprising things.... they rarely do nothing at
all." Id. at 294. This section of the Article develops a related point-that the problems
created by § 10() may derive from the overly rigid view that "nature" (naturally occurring
populations) and "culture" (reintroduced populations) operate in two distinct physical
and philosophical realms.
312 See supra Part IA.1.
313 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(C).
314 Compare id. § 1532(6) (describing an endangered species as one "which is in danger
of extinction"), with id. § 1532(20) (describing a threatened species as one "which is likely
to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future"). On its face, § 9 forbids
the "taking" of endangered, but not threatened, species. Id. § 1538(a) (1) (B). The "tak-
ing" prohibition has been extended to threatened species by regulation. See 50 C.F.Rt
§ 17.31 (2001). The ESA provides that "[t]he term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). See generally Bab-
bitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding
expansive definition of "take").
315 This is particularly true if the reintroduced population has been designated nones-
sential to the continued existence of the species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (2) (B). In that
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troduction program allow ranchers to shoot wolves that are caught
killing livestock on private property.31 6
On their face, the ESA reintroduction provisions distinguish be-
tween "natural" and "experimental" populations-an abstract, legal
distinction that is not readily discernible in any biological or physical
sense. The practical difficulties attendant in such a scheme are illus-
trated by the case of gray wolf reintroduction in the northern Rocky
Mountain region. In 1995, pursuant to the Northern Rocky Mountain
Wolf Recovery Plan, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) transported
thirty-three gray wolves from Canada for release into central Idaho
and into Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming.317 The FWS ac-
knowledged that lone wolves from Montana had been sighted in the
release area, but concluded that such lone dispersers failed to consti-
tute a naturally occurring wolf "population."318 Soon after the re-
lease, the Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation and others brought suit,
alleging, inter alia, that the FWS exceeded its authority under the
ESA, which confines reintroduction efforts to areas outside the current
range of the species. 319 Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted that the over-
lap of experimental and naturally occurring gray wolf populations vio-
lated the ESA's mandate that the two groups be kept "wholly separate
geographically. '3 20
In a now infamous decision, federal district court Judge William
F. Downes struggled mightily in the face of the Act's seemingly abso-
lute distinction between the work of humans and the work of nature.
Judge Downes agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that Congress in-
tended to grant full endangered species protection to naturally occur-
ring wolves, even when they wandered into experimental areas.321
Therefore, he struck down the final reintroduction rules that reduced
the protection to all wolves within the experimental area, finding that
the "blanket treatment of all wolves found within the designated ex-
perimental population areas as experimental animals is contrary to
law."3 22 Noting the desire of Congress to avoid "potentially compli-
cated problems of law enforcement," Judge Downes rigidly enforced
case, in all areas outside of national wildlife refuges or national parks, the population's
protected status is reduced to that of a species proposed to be listed. Id.
§ 1539 0)(2)(C)(i). In addition, critical habitat may not be designated for nonessential
experimental populations. Id. § 1539 0) (2) (C) (ii).
316 See 50 G.F.R. § 17.84(i) (3) (ii) (2001).
317 See Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Wyo. 1997); Mimi S.
Wolok, Experimenting with Experimental Populations, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,018,
10,027-28 (1996).
318 See Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 987 F. Supp. at 1370.
319 See id. at 1355-56.
320 Id. at 1355.
321 Id. at 1373-74 (interpreting legislative history).
322 Id. at 1375-76.
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the requirement that natural and introduced populations be kept
"wholly separate geographically."323 With the "utmost reluctance," he
ordered the removal of all reintroduced non-native wolves and their
offspring from the experimental area.324 Although rigid, Judge
Downes's decision was not unreasonable in light of Congress's histori-
cal propensity to distinguish "wild nature" from that which bears a
human imprint.3 25
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit took steps to avoid the mischief cre-
ated by strictly applying the congressional dichotomy between native
and non-native animals.3 26 Purporting to introduce an element of "bi-
ological reality" into Congress's scheme, the court of appeals noted
that it would be physically impossible to keep wild and experimental
populations forever separate.3 27 Accordingly, the court declined to
engage in a literal interpretation of the provision at issue.328 Instead,
the court held that "the Department [of the Interior] reasonably exer-
cised its management authority under section 10(j) in defining the
experimental wolf population by location."3 29 As a result, the court
upheld the FWS's determination that the legal protection accorded to
individual animals should be determined by "geographic location,"
rather than by "animal origin. '330
From an analytical perspective, the Tenth Circuit's decision is an
important step toward acknowledging that the distinction between na-
ture and culture might be untenable. In the short term, the decision
might reduce the protections accorded to individual wild wolves if
323 Id. at 1372-73.
324 Id. at 1376. Some feared thatJudge Downes's order may have amounted to a death
sentence for the reintroduced wolves. See Elizabeth Cowan Brown, The "Wholly Separate"
Truth: Did the Yellowstone Wolf Reintroduction Violate Section 10(j) of the Endangered Species Act?,
27 B.C. ENrL. AsF. L. REv. 425, 462 (2000). Brown observes that:
[E]ven if all of the reintroduced wolves could be tracked, captured, and
removed, there is nowhere for them to go." Interior Secretary Bruce Bab-
bitt explained prior to reintroduction that, "Itlhe Canadians have said no
returns, no refunds. [The wolves] can't go back to Canada." American
zoos are already at capacity and do not have enough room for these wolves.
The only option left would be euthanasia-death.
Id. (citations omitted).
325 See supra Part II.B.l.
326 See Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000).
327 See id. at 1237 (observing that "wolves can and do roam for hundreds of miles and
cannot be precluded from intermingling with the released experimental population").
328 See id. ("While the language of section 10(0) (1), read in isolation, might suggest an
experimental population can only be comprised of those particular animals physically relo-
cated (and any offspring arising solely therefrom), such a narrow interpretation is not
supported by the provision, or the Endangered Species Act, read as a whole.").
329 Id. The court also found that the presence of lone wolves from Montana did not
violate § 10(j)'s apparent requirement that reintroduced wolves be kept separate from
nonexperimental populations, holding that "an individual animal does not a species, popu-
lation or population segment make." See id. at 1236.
330 Id. at 1237.
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they wander into the experimental area.331 In the long term, how-
ever, the decision advances the larger goal of bringing endangered
species back from the brink of extinction. 332 The court's impulse to
synthesize the treatment of naturally occurring and introduced wolves
is faithful to biological reality. Under the court's approach, the rele-
vant issue becomes how best to protect wolves, rather than how to
keep natural and reintroduced wolves separate.
4. The Antiquities Act
As discussed in the preceding two sections, the Wilderness Act
and the Endangered Species Act potentially withhold protection from
landscapes and species that bear the mark of a human presence. In
contrast, the Antiquities Act seemingly requires evidence of human civi-
lization as a prerequisite to protection. Ironically, critics have argued
that particular areas do not qualify for monument status because they
are too scenic, too large, or bear too little trace of human activity-the
very attributes that would virtually guarantee protection under wilder-
ness or endangered species legislation. 33 3 Although these two statu-
tory approaches appear to be direct opposites, they both derive from
the same impulse-the tendency to distinguish conceptually between
humans and nature. Despite the probable intention of Congress in
1906 to protect only tamed landscapes with archaeological signifi-
cance, the legislature employed language susceptible to broader inter-
pretation. As a result-in defiance of the historical nature-culture
dichotomy-the statute has been utilized to protect nature and cul-
ture alike.
Distilled to its essence, the fundamental problem of the Antiqui-
ties Act may be that it incorporates both conservationist and preserva-
tionist impulses. That is, the Act contains both narrow language
conserving objects of antiquity for human use, and broad language pre-
serving areas in their natural condition.3 34 Keeping in mind the histor-
ical context, it seems likely that Congress intended the statute to be
primarily conservationist in tone. The sparse legislative history em-
phasizes the limited size of national monuments and the protection of
small archaeological artifacts. 335 Edgar Lee Hewett, a well-known ar-
chaeologist who drafted the bill that became the Antiquities Act, indi-
cated that areas "sufficiently rich in historic and scientific interest and
scenic beauty" would be protected as congressionally created national
331 See id.
332 See id.
333 See supra notes 6, 114, 201 and accompanying text.
334 For the distinction between conservation and preservation, see supra Part II.B.1.
335 See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
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parks, rather than executively created National Monuments.33 6 More-
over, in 1906, when the statute was enacted, the utilitarian conserva-
tion movement was in its ascendancy.3 37 As late as 1913, the
conservationists who favored utilitarian resource use soundly defeated
the preservationists in the famous battle over Hetch Hetchy.338
Despite this evidence of narrow congressional intent, the text of
the Antiquities Act undeniably contains the seeds of preservation-
ism.33 9 Just ten years after the passage of the Antiquities Act, those
seeds would germinate into the quintessential preservationist statute,
the organic act for the newly chartered National Park Service. 340 If
Congress intended to protect only cultural artifacts, it used language
ill-suited to that task, for the statute clearly authorizes presidents to
reserve lands containing objects of "historic or scientific interest."341
This expansive language was added at the request of the Department
of the Interior to protect scenic and scientific resources.342 In 1920,
the U.S. Supreme Court found that the phrase was broad enough to
support President Theodore Roosevelt's creation of the 800,000-acre
336 See H.R. REP. No. 59-2224, at 3 (1906) (quoting memorandum from Professor
Hewett). Professor Hewett wrote:
Unquestionably some of these regions are sufficiently rich in historic and
scientific interest and scenic beauty to warrant their organization into per-
manent national parks. Many others should be temporarily withdrawn and
allowed to revert to the public domain after the ruins thereon have been
examined by competent authority, the collections therefrom properly
cared for, and all data that can be secured made a matter of permanent
record.
Id As the text of the Antiquities Act indicates, Congress declined to adopt Professor Hew-
ett's suggestion that monument reservations exist only temporarily.
337 For example, the National Forests System's Organic Act was passed in 1897. Act of
June 4, 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat 11, 34-36 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482
(2000)).
338 Wood, supra note 252, at 1 (describing the preservationists' unsuccessful attempt to
prevent the damming of the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park to provide a
water supply for the city of San Francisco); see also NASH, supra note 232, at 161-81 (provid-
ing a detailed account of the Hetch Hetchy controversy).
339 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
340 National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 235, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (2000)). Although Congress had created a
handful of national parks at "irregular intervals" beginning with the reservation of Yellow-
stone, no comprehensive management authority was created until the 1916 legislation.
COGGINS ET Al., supra note 19, at 116.
341 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
342 See Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, Nos. 2:97CV479, 2:97CV492, 2:97CV863,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15852, at 9 (D. Utah Aug. 11, 1999) (noting that although
Congress repeatedly "rejected attempts to include the Department's proposal," it was ap-
parently "unable to pass the limited archaeologists' bill because of bureaucratic delays and
various disagreements between museums and universities seeking authority to excavate
ruins on public lands") (citingJohannsen, supra note 74, at 450). In addition, the bill that
was ultimately enacted expanded the size limitation from a maximum of 640 acres to "the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be pro-
tected." 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15852, at *10.
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Grand Canyon National Monument.3 43 Thus, the problem-and per-
haps also the genius-of the Antiquities Act can be traced to Con-
gress's unwitting synthesis of nature and culture into the same
protective statutory scheme.
This statutory schizophrenia-arguably extending protection to
both nature and culture-has provoked several battles over the past
century. Although one easily might have predicted that the ambigu-
ous statutory language would spawn some minor disagreements, Con-
gress could not have foreseen the bitterness of the debate when it
passed the Antiquities Act in 1906. What could explain such a heated
response to the creation of large monuments by the presidents? One
potential explanation is the age-old conceptual divide between the
realm of nature and that of human society. Often, the anger of those
who oppose national monuments on pragmatic grounds seems to
have an underpinning of moral outrage.344 Some criticism conveys a
tone of betrayal, as if the creation of excessively large or scenic na-
tional monuments has violated some implicit cultural understanding
as to the natural order of things. 34 5 With only slight exaggeration,
one might find the current outrage over the Clinton monuments-
purporting to protect both cultural remnants and large landscapes
under the same statutory umbrella-evocative of past condemnation
of the evolutionists' linking of man and ape, or the astronomers' re-
duction of the earth to just one of many planets orbiting around the
sun.
3 4 6
III
THE FUTURE: PRESERVING MONUMENTAL LANDSCAPES?
The Antiquities Act... is one of the most successful environmental laws in
American history.
John Leshy
Interior Department Solicitor (2000)3 47
For almost one hundred years, presidents have consistently used
the Antiquities Act to protect large tracts of land from develop-
ment.3 48 Just as consistently, critics have decried such actions as abu-
sive and excessive. 349 In the face of such consistent criticism, the
Antiquities Act has proved remarkably resilient. This Part considers
why the Act has endured, despite the flaws alleged by its detractors.
343 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920). The Cameron case is dis-
cussed supra Part I.B.1.
344 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
345 See id.
346 See supra Part II.A.
347 Blumenthal, supra note 6.
348 See supra Part I.A.
349 See supra Part I.C.
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Part llI.A discusses the relative failure of political will to amend or
repeal the statute and examines whether a president has legal author-
ity to reverse the executive proclamations of his predecessor. Part
III.B suggests that the Act's longevity is attributable to its ability to
serve core values the public and the courts have identified. Finally,
Part III.C is prescriptive, suggesting that for all its asserted flaws, the
Act continues to serve a valuable function that no other legislation
serves, and that appropriate checks on the Executive's authority are
already in place. Although history has demonstrated that we love to
hate the Antiquities Act,3 50 this Article concludes that the statute
should be retained in its present form. Over the past century, all
three branches of government have implicitly supported an interpre-
tation of the Act that allows protection of large landscapes as antiqui-
ties.351 Congress and the courts should explicitly recognize and
validate this long tradition of executive preservation.
A. The Temptation to Repeal
Despite the relative failure of reform efforts over the past cen-
tury,3 52 the temptation to revoke individual monument designations
or to weaken the Antiquities Act itself persists to this day. The most
recent impetus for reform occurred when former President Clinton
designated more than five million acres of land as national monu-
ments. 353 Although he created the 1.7 million acre Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument during his first term, President Clinton
designated the bulk of his national monuments during his last year in
office.5 5 4 The furor over the Clinton monuments-followed by little
or no concrete reform-illustrates a pattern that has become
familiar.355
When viewed from a historical perspective, the pattern suggests
that western politicians have consistently resisted the designation of
new monuments in their home states, condemning them as federal
350 See supra Part I.D.
351 See supra Parts L.A-C.
352 See supra Part I.C.
353 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
354 Blumenthal, supra note 6. President Clinton set aside more than one million acres
as national monuments during his last week in office. See Clinton Will Create Six More Na-
tional Monuments in Wes4 ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,Jan. 17, 2001, at A7 [hereinafter Clinton
Will Create]. This type of eleventh-hour preservation was not without precedent: President
Eisenhower established the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Monument during his
last week in office, and President Theodore Roosevelt created new monuments two days
before his term expired. Blumenthal, supra note 6.
355 At the time of this writing, the first Clinton monument, the Grand Staircase-Esca-
lante of Utah, has been in existence for nearly six years without triggering concrete
reform.
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"land grabs."35 6 Although such political rhetoric may curry favor with
local constituents, it has consistently fallen short of commanding the
congressional majority necessary to weaken or abolish the Antiquities
Act.3 57 As one journalist observed, politicians of both political parties
have been "conspicuously un-outraged" by the reservation of the
Grand Staircase-Escalante monument.3 58
1. Executive Inaction
Overall, efforts to undo the Clinton monuments have proved
both legally and politically infeasible. Two reactions merit a brief dis-
cussion to illustrate the tenor of modem critics. First, opponents of
the Clinton monuments explored the possibility of overturning them
through executive orders issued by succeeding President George W.
Bush. Before taking office, President-elect Bush vowed to review all
"eleventh-hour executive orders, rules and regulations" in order to
promote a "balanced approach to [the] environment that is based on
working closely with states and local communities." 359 Congress, for
its part, requested a report from the Congressional Research Service
on the authority of a President to modify or eliminate national monu-
ments. 360 However, a month after the new administration took office,
356 See Blumenthal, supra note 6.
357 SeeJon Margolis, In Washington, the Emperor is on Babbitt's Side, HIGH COUNTRY NEws
(Paonia, Colo.), Nov. 22, 1999, at 15 (concluding that western monument opponents are
"on their own" and that "Western Republicans have been unable to export their ire over
Grand Staircase-Escalante" to the rest of the nation).
358 Id. As the author observed:
Nor is it just Democrats and Republican moderates who have been conspic-
uously un-outraged [over the creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante Na-
tional Monument]. So have GOP conservatives from the South and
Midwest They are pro-business, but not anti-nature. They are fierce pro-
tectors of private property, but not hostile to public land, and the Antiqui-
ties Act only covers land that belongs to the federal government. These
Republicans may not like the way Bill Clinton went about Grand Staircase-
Escalante, but they're not particularly unhappy about the outcome.
Id.
359 Clinton Will Create, supra note 354 (quoting Scott McClellan, spokesman for the
Bush transition team).
360 See PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Pub. No. RS20647, AUTHORITY OF A
PRESIDENT TO MODIFY OR ELIMINATE A NATIONAL MONUMENT (2000). The report cautiously
suggested that the President may lack such authority, concluding:
No President has ever revoked a previously established monument. That a
President can modify a previous Presidentially-created monument seems
clear. However, there is no language in the 1906 Act that expressly autho-
rizes revocation; there is no instance of past practice in that regard, and
there is an attorney general's opinion concluding that the President lacks
that authority.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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Interior Secretary Gale A. Norton announced that President Bush
would not seek to overturn any of the Clinton national monuments.3 61
The new administration may have made this announcement be-
cause of a reluctance to pay the political price associated with disman-
tling national monuments. As the Washington Post speculated,
"[c]oming just a month after President Bush took office vowing to
review Clinton's actions, [Norton's statement] suggested that the ad-
ministration recognized that a battle with environmentalists over land
designations would be unwise as the White House seeks to push
through its tax cut plan and other legislative initiatives."3 62 Despite its
unwillingness to revoke the Clinton monuments, the Bush administra-
tion was careful to distinguish its natural resource policy from that of
its Democratic predecessor. In her statement, Secretary Norton criti-
cized President Clinton for hastily designating monuments and for
failing to consult with state and local governments.3 63 In addition,
Secretary Norton indicated that the Bush administration may seek to
adjust the monuments' boundaries and to manage them in a way that
allows certain existing uses to continue.3 64 Although monument sup-
porters fear that such seemingly innocuous modifications may consti-
tute a de facto abolition,365 Secretary Norton's announcement does
address critics' claims that the Antiquities Act allows presidents to des-
ignate monuments without accountability or meaningful checks on
their power.
President Bush's acceptance of the Clinton monuments may also
reflect the legal conclusion that a president lacks the authority to re-
361 See Eric Pianin, White House Won't Fight Monument Designations: Norton Says Bounda-
ries, Land Use Rules May Be Amended; WASH. PosT, Feb. 21, 2001, at A7.
362 Id.; see also Monumental Reversal SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 4, 2000, at A14 (noting that
"Republican vice presidential candidate Dick Cheney was being more idealistic than politi-
cally astute when he recently raised the possibility that a George W. Bush victory in Novem-
ber could lead to reversal of some of President Clinton's controversial monument
designations"). The article accurately predicted that "Cheney's proposal likely will play
well in the West, but it will have little resonance elsewhere. And if Bush wins in November,
he may have second thoughts about reversing Clinton's monumental activity." Id.
363 Pianin, supra note 361. Secretary Norton's stated that "[w]e're now cleaning up
after the fact and doing things that should have been done before the monuments were
designated.... The monument designations were more show than substance. We now
have to provide the substance." Id.
364 Id
365 See, e.g., Monumental Decisions, DENVER POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at 7B (noting Secretary
Norton's willingness to change monument boundaries or alter monument rules, and fear-
ing that this "philosophy could be only one step away from rolling back the monument
designations altogether. While they still would exist on paper, in the field their preserva-
tion could be shredded, one small cut at a time."); see also M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Norton Stays
in Critics' Cross Hairs: Former Coloradan Approaches 100th Day as Interior Secretary, RocKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), May 7, 2001, at 7A (noting that Secretary Norton "sent
letters to state and local leaders saying each monument ... should have its boundaries and
land use restrictions revisited").
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voke a national monument previously established through executive
action. 366 Although this issue has never been tested, 367 a strong argu-
ment can be made that the President lacks such power. The Antiqui-
ties Act specifically delegates authority to the President to "declare by
public proclamation" 368 national monuments, but is silent regarding
the authority to terminate monuments. 369 A 1938 Attorney General
opinion reasoned that presidential proclamations under the Antiqui-
ties Act have the force of law, and can be repealed only through subse-
quent acts of congressional lawmaking:
The grant of power to execute a trust, even discretionally, by no
means implies the further power to undo it when it has been com-
pleted. A duty properly performed by the Executive under statutory
authority has the validity and sanctity which belong to the statute
itself, and, unless it be within the terms of the power conferred by
that statute, the Executive can no more destroy his own authorized
work, without some other legislative sanction, than any other per-
son can. To assert such a principle is to claim for the Executive the
power to repeal or alter an act of Congress at will. 370
Finding that the Antiquities Act contains neither express nor implied
authority to terminate monuments, the opinion concluded that a
president lacks authority to abolish national monuments. 371
Arguments to the contrary may emphasize that presidents have
routinely revised or revoked the executive orders of their predeces-
sors, often to promote a different ideological agenda.372 However, in
determining the force of an executive order or proclamation, it is im-
portant to discern the underlying legal justification for such action. 373
Although later presidents may reverse orders involving minor policy
366 For an excellent analysis of this issue, see BALDWIN, supra note 360.
367 No president has ever revoked a national monument. Id. at 2.
368 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
369 See id.; see also BALDWIN, supra note 360, at 3 n.7 (concluding that it is legally insig-
nificant whether a president creates monuments through proclamation or through execu-
tive order).
370 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 187 (1938) (quoting 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 359, 364 (1862)
(finding President lacked power to revoke or rescind military reservation President estab-
lished pursuant to discretion delegated by statute)).
371 See id. at 189. The Attorney General found implied executive authority to modify
the boundaries of established monuments in the statutory requirement "that the limits of
the monuments 'in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be protected.'" See id. at 188 (quoting 16
U.S.C. § 431). However, the Attorney General concluded that "it does not follow from his
power so to confine that area that he has the power to abolish a monument entirely." Id.
372 See ROBERT A. SHANLEY, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 83
(1992).
373 See id. at 49 (observing that executive orders "have the force of law ... when issued
under a valid claim of authority... [but that] increasingly, orders have been promulgated
under unclear claims of authority").
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initiatives without challenge, 374 it seems unlikely that a reviewing
court would countenance the casual reversal of an executive order
promulgated pursuant to a specific delegation of authority by Con-
gress.3 75 In a context distinct from natural resources law, the Su-
preme Court in INS v. Chadha endorsed the general proposition that
when the executive branch acts pursuant to a lawful delegation of au-
thority, such action can be revoked only by an act of Congress. 376 In
holding that the legislative veto provision was unconstitutional, the
Court stated, "Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until
that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked."377 Similarly, a
court might find that the executive designation of national monu-
ments has the force of law, and that only an act of Congress can over-
turn it.37
2. Legislative Inaction
As a second reaction to President Clinton's aggressive use of the
Antiquities Act, legislators introduced a spate of reform proposals in
Congress following the 1996 designation of the Grand Staircase-Esca-
lante National Monument, and introduced additional proposals fol-
lowing the 2000-2001 designations.379 Notably, none of the legislative
sponsors sought to repeal the Grand Staircase-Escalante designation,
perhaps fearing the adverse public reaction that such a proposal
would engender. Rather, many of the proposed amendments were
partisan expressions of anger and disapproval, lacking any realistic
possibility of becoming law. For example, congressional representa-
tives from California, Idaho, and Oregon expressed their disapproval
374 See id. at 83 (noting that since "executive orders are seldom used in major policy
initiatives, they are rarely struck down by the courts or revoked by Congress. More com-
monly, they are revised by the presidents who issued them or amended or sometimes re-
voked by succeeding presidents of different partisan or ideological outlook.").
375 SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring). In concluding that an executive order seizing the nation's steel mills was
invalid, Justice Jackson was careful to distinguish three spheres of presidential powers. See
id. at 635-38. He argued that the President's authority was at its maximum when he acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, "includ[ing] all that he pos-
sesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Id. at 635.
376 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983). In the context of a deportation decision by the Attor-
ney General, the Court stated:
Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's deporta-
tion-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress'
original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make
that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can imple-
ment in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the
President.
Id. at 954-55.
377 1&L at 955.
378 In a few cases, Congress itself has abolished monuments. See BALDWIN, supra note
360, at 2.
379 See Blumenthal, supra note 6; supra text accompanying note 354.
2002] 1389
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1389 2001-2002
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
of the Clinton monuments by introducing legislation that would have
precluded the designation of additional monuments in their home
states without an act of Congress. 380 Still other proposals would have
revoked or limited the Antiquities Act's delegation of authority to the
President, reserving the right to establish national monuments prima-
rily to Congress itself.38 1
Other proposals sought to incorporate public participation into
the process of designating monuments. For example, under a propo-
sal passed by the House in September 1999,382 the President would
have been required to solicit public participation before designating
monuments and to consult with the governor and congressional dele-
gation of the affected state at least sixty days prior to designation.38 3
By the end of the Clinton presidency, Congress had not enacted
any of the reform proposals. One of the harshest critics of the Clinton
monuments, Republican Representative James V. Hansen of Utah,
urged members of the House to introduce legislation to challenge
monuments in their home districts.38 4 However, Representative Han-
sen indicated that he did "not intend to introduce legislation of his
own," and acknowledged that "a 'slashing and burning' approach"
would not be politically feasible. 385
Although executive implementation of the Antiquities Act has
been criticized harshly for almost a century, the Act has exhibited a
380 See H.R 4294, 104th Cong. (1996) (forbidding additional executive monument
designations in Oregon without congressional approval); H.R. 4242, 104th Cong. (1996)
(forbidding additional executive monument designations in California without congres-
sional approval); H.R. 4120, 104th Cong. (1996) (forbidding additional executive monu-
ment designations in Idaho without congressional approval).
381 See H.R. 4121, 106th Cong. (2000) (limiting to each president the designation of
only one national monument, such monument designation to expire within two years un-
less approved by joint resolution of Congress); H.R. 4214, 104th Cong. (1996) (requiring
congressional approval of the establishment of national monuments); H.R. 4147, 104th
Cong. (1996) (prohibiting extension or establishment of national monuments without ex-
press act of Congress); H.R. 4118, 104th Cong. (1996) (limiting authority of the President
to designate more than 5000 acres as national monuments).
382 145 CONG. REc. H8657 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1999) (indicating 408 votes for passage
of the bill).
383 H.R. 1487, 106th Cong. (1999). The Act also would have required that national
monument management plans comply with the procedural requirements of NEPA. Id.; see
also National Monument Public Participation Act of 1999, S. 729, 106th Cong. (1999) (re-
quiring congressional and public participation in monument designation).
384 Pianin, supra note 361.
385 Id. (stating that Rep. Hansen "does not foresee a major effort in Congress to roll
back Clinton's designations"). One "noncontroversial change," passed by the House on
May 1, 2001, would allow hunting in Idaho's Craters of the Moon National Monument, a
provision that was "inadvertently" excluded from President Clinton's proclamation. See
Monumental Second Thoughts, CONG. DAILY, May 17, 2001; see also Norton Seeks Proposal for
Protected Areas, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2001, atA14 (describing unanimous vote of the House
Resources Committee to redesignate the area as a national preserve so that hunting could
be allowed).
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remarkable tenacity and ability to endure. In an ironic display of def-
erence, both courts and Congress have attempted to place the burden
of reform-with its potential to trigger the public ire-upon one an-
other. In 1945, a federal district court stated that "the burden is on
the Congress to pass such remedial legislation as may obviate any in-
justice brought about [by excessive acquisitive proclivities of the Exec-
utive].*"386 In a parallel statement nearly fifty years later, one
legislative proposal attempted to shift the burden squarely back upon
the judicial branch. The proposed Grand Staircase-Escalante Na-
tional Monument Minor Boundary Adjustments Act contained an ex-
press disclaimer against approval of the monument, but stopped short
of taking action to repeal the designation, specifying that "[i] t is the
intent of Congress that the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monu-
ment be abolished if any court finds that the President exceeded the
authority of the President under the [Antiquities Act] in establishing
the national monument. '38 7
In light of Congress's political inability or reluctance to under-
take meaningful reform, the implicit message of history may be that
the Antiquities Act-although maligned-continues to serve some vi-
tal national purpose. The next subpart attempts to identify the core
values that have made the Act so resistant to change over the course of
a century. By explicitly recognizing the Act's strengths, it may be pos-
sible to carve out a productive and modem role for the Antiquities Act
in the twenty-first century.
B. Identifying Core Values
The Antiquities Act has demonstrated a remarkable tenacity over
the past century, an endurance that is puzzling in light of the harsh
criticism periodically leveled against it. 388 This subpart attempts to
identify core values the Act promotes that may explain its longevity.
Although the Act's virtues rarely have been expressed explicitly and
comprehensively, at least four fundamental strengths can be gleaned
by drawing upon statements of the courts, the politicians, and the
public.
First, the public may value the Act for its ability to protect large
landscapes. 38 9 Despite the outrage some politicians have expressed
against the Clinton monument designations, contemporaneous public
opinion polls demonstrated widespread, bipartisan support for land-
386 Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945); see also supra Part I.B.2
(discussing the district court's decision in Franke).
387 H.R 3909, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
388 See supra Parts I, III.A. But see supra note 347 and accompanying text.
389 Although critics have argued that the Act was intended only to protect archaeologi-
cal ruins and small tracts of land, the Supreme Court has acquiesced in the use of the Act
to protect large landscapes such as the Grand Canyon. See supra Part I.B.1.
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scape preservation. 390 One survey indicated that "a strongly bipartisan
76 percent of Arizona voters" supported President Clinton's designa-
tion of national monuments in Arizona.391 Recognizing such public
opinion and the need for the support of urban voters, even the
staunchest political opponents have declined to speak out unequivo-
cally against such protection. 392 Some conservative politicians have
even advanced their own land protection proposals, albeit primarily as
a defensive tactic to ward off suggestions for more aggressive
measures.
393
The courts have also supported the Act's ability to preserve land-
scapes up to several million acres in size,3 94 protecting a wide range of
natural features including geologic features, structures of glacial for-
mation, natural wonders, and tourist attractions.395 In addition, the
courts have specifically approved the use of the Act to protect plant,
animal, and fish life,3 96 and even the "ecosystem" associated with wild
Arctic caribou herds in Alaska.397
390 As one newspaper columnist stated, "These days, opinion polls show that Ameri-
cans-Republicans as well as Democrats-want government to protect the nation's most
striking landscapes be they backyard wood lots or nooks of remote wilderness most people
will never see." Todd Wilkinson, To Protect Land, Uncle Sam Buys More: Recent Purchases of
Western Acreage Are Backed by Growing Public Support for Preservation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 14, 1999, at 1. The article also cites a Zogby International poll of Republican voters
in five states indicating that "the desire for landscape protection transcends party lines."
Id.; see also Gary Bryner, John Leshy on Shaping the Modern West: The Role of the Executive
Branch, RESOURCE LAw NOTES (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Sch. of Law, Univ. of Colo. at Boul-
der), Mar. 2000, at 2, 2 (citing the 1998 passage of some 170 bipartisan ballot initiatives to
limit growth and protect open space); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise , 87
CORNELL L. REv. 158, 158-59 (discussing overwhelming success of open space initiatives in
2000).
391 Jerry Kammer, Gulf Grows over Western Land Use: New National Monuments Stir Pas-
sions over Preservation, State Rights, and Future of the West, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Jan. 11,
2000, at 1 (citing survey by the Behavior Research Center of Phoenix).
392 See Rocky Barker, "War" More Like a Skirmish, DENVER PoST, July 23, 2000, at 6H
(noting western Republican politicians' bitter opposition to President Clinton's use of the
Antiquities Act, but concluding that "few of them suggest the lands in question don't de-
serve protection. No one has proposed a massive new program to build roads into remain-
ing roadless areas."); see also Kammer, supra note 391 (quoting press secretary to
Republican Governor Jane Hull of Arizona as stating that "[s]ihe doesn't like people in
Washington telling Arizona what is going to happen inside Arizona's borders," but adding
that the Governor "is a big supporter of open space").
393 See Matt Kelley, GOP Group Supports Land-Protection, AP ONLINE, Mar. 28, 2000, avail-
able at 2000 WL 17833783 (stating that western Republicans "hope to set terms for protec-
tion rather than have the Clinton administration impose them").
394 See, e.g., supra Part I.B.5 (discussing court opinion approving three monuments in
Alaska comprising almost twenty million acres); supra Part I.B.1 (discussing court opinion
approving 800,000-acre monument).
395 See supra Part I.B.
396 See supra Part I.B.5 (discussing court opinion approving protection of ecosystem
supporting plant, animal, and fish life, particularly Arctic caribou); supra Part I.B.3 (dis-
cussing court opinion approving protection of water pool supporting rare fish population).
397 See supra Part I.B.5.
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This preservation of federal lands and open space can be sup-
ported on an economic, as well as philosophical, basis. One promi-
nent article on the transformation of public lands from commodity
uses to nonconsumptive uses concludes that "[t]he imputed market
benefits of public lands devoted to recreation and preservation far ex-
ceed the economic benefits of commodity extraction uses. Further-
more . .. the value of preservation ... overwhelms the economic
benefits of recreation and commodity uses."398
Second, society may value the Act for its ability to serve a unique
role among natural resource laws-that of protecting "living land-
scapes." 399 Rather than simply duplicate the results that could be
achieved under the Wilderness Act400 or the National Park legisla-
tion,40 1 the Antiquities Act allows for the designation and manage-
ment of unique areas where human ties to the land are particularly
apparent.40 2 Former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt noted the inter-
relationship between humans and nature. In criticizing the tempta-
398 Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q 140, 145-46 (1999). The authors estimate that recreation and ecosystem benefits
exceed commodity benefits by a factor of sixty-two in the national forests, and by a factor of
over twenty on lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management. Id. at 238 & n.502
(cautioning that dollar estimates rely on innovative methods and "should only be viewed as
preliminary, illustrative calculations"). The authors also note that,
One group of scientists has estimated the global value of seventeen essen-
tial ecosystem services (for example, climate and water regulation, natural
waste treatment, and nutrient cycling) at $33 trillion, most of which is nor-
mally not reflected in market prices. This estimate compares with $18 tril-
lion as the value of all the goods and services provided by the world's
people each year.
Id. at 200. But see Robert R.M. Verchick, Feathers or Gold? A Civic Economics for Environmental
Law, 25 HARv. ENrL. L. REv. 95, 96 (2001) (offering a critique of both moral and market
advocates in the realm of environmental policy).
399 See, e.g., Donna M. Kemp, Third Monument's a Charm, DESERET NEWs (Salt Lake City,
Utah), July 27, 2000, at Al (discussing "living landscape monuments" of the BLM, man-
aged to "protect rugged and isolated areas of the West" and to protect the heritage of the
western way of life).
400 See, e.g., supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
401 See, e.g., supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
402 Secretary Babbitt proposed a new designation of "national landscape monuments"
for the protection of entire ecosystems. Unlike national parks, hunting and grazing might
be permitted. Also unlike parks, the system would not explicitly promote tourism and
recreation through the development of visitor centers, gas stations, or other amenities. See
Mark Eddy, Babbitt: Time is Now to Protect West's Lands, DENVER POs-r, Feb. 18, 2000, at 1A.
As described by Secretary Babbitt, "This is not about creating a second national park ser-
vice." Penelope Purdy, New Mission for Public Lands: BLM Tackles Role as Environmental
Champion, DENVER Posr, July 30, 2000, atJ1 (describing "history written across a landscape
as big as the American West" and a proposed "landscape conservation system" lacking such
traditional national park features as developed campgrounds, cafes, souvenir shops, and
paved roads).
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tion to preserve only "little postage stamps on the landscape,' 40 3
Babbitt argued passionately,
[Past politicians] went west onto this landscape of riches, would see
a ruin, and would make a national park or a monument out of only
the forty acres surrounding the ruin.... Somebody [would see] a
ruin and fenc[e] off twenty acres, ten, five, forty around it. And you
begin looking across this landscape and say: "Hey, wait a minute.
This isn't about a ruin here or there. Don't you see, it's about a
whole, interwoven landscape? It's about communities that were liv-
ing in and on this land.., and drawing their living and their inspi-
ration and their spirituality from a landscape. 40 4
Secretary Babbitt concluded with the provocative question, "Doesn't it
make sense in light of a subsequent 100 years of understanding to say
that we have room in the West to protect the landscape, if you will, an
anthropological ecosystem?" 40 5
Third, the President's authority under the Act to take prompt
measures to preserve the status quo in the face of imminent threats to
special landscapes might generate additional support.406 Whereas the
President can act in a matter of weeks or months, congressional de-
bate over landscape protection might continue for years or even de-
cades. 407 One district court judge considered a challenge to the
403 Bruce Babbitt, From Grand Staircase to Grand Canyon Parashant: Is There a Mon-
umental Future for the BLU? Transcript of Remarks: University of Denver College of Law
Carver Lecture (Feb. 17, 2000), in 3 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 223, 227 (2000).
404 Id.
405 Id. at 227-28. Professor John BrinckerhoffJackson documents the American de-
sire to "preserve wilderness or natural areas as fragments of what we might call the original
design of creation." JOHN BRINCKERHOFF JACKSON, THE NECESSITY FOR RUINS 100-01
(1980). Professor Brinckerhoff notes that the "instinct behind the drive is very similar to
that which inspires our architectural restorations: to restore as much as possible the origi-
nal aspect of the landscape." Id. at 101. He connects this landscape preservation impulse
to an emerging concept of history. See id. at 100-02.
406 See infra notes 408-09 and accompanying text.
407 See Getches, supra note 37, at 304-05 (discussing executive designation of Jackson
Hole National Monument in reaction to eighteen-year congressional impasse); James R.
Rasband, Utah's Grand Staircase: The Right Path to Wilderness Preservation?, 70 U. COLO. L.
REv. 483, 492-98 (1999) (discussing designation of Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument in reaction to decades-long congressional impasse over wilderness designation
in Utah). Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt noted:
[I'm saying,] "It would be great to get these protection issues resolved in
the Congressional, legislative process." But if that's not possible, I'm pre-
pared to go back to the President, and not only ask, not only advise, but
also implore him to use his powers under the Antiquities Act. I'm prepared
to say to him: "Mr. President, if they don't, and you do, you will be vindi-
cated by history for generations to come." Just as President Harrison, Presi-
dent Cleveland, Woodrow Wilson, Taft, notably Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin
D. Roosevelt, Jimmy Carter, virtually every President in the past century has
done, often in the midst of intense controversy, but in every single case,
validated by history and the generations of Americans who have this passion
for the western landscape.
Babbitt, supra note 403, at 227.
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actions of the President and the Secretary of the Interior to preserve
vast tracts of Alaskan lands in the face of a congressional impasse over
pending protective legislation.408 The court concluded that invalida-
tion of the executive actions would hinder the public interest, which
could best be served by maintaining the lands in their present condi-
tion until Congress could pass protective legislation.40 9
The Executive's prompt action in situations such as these has as-
sisted the legislative process on numerous occasions. Many treasured
national parks-including the Grand Canyon National Park-were
protected first by the Executive under the Antiquities Act.410 If a Pres-
ident has erred on the side of caution, then Congress has the ability to
reverse the unwanted monument designation.41' But, if the Executive
has failed to take prompt action to protect important landscapes, then
there is little that Congress can do to rectify that inaction. Decisions
to develop land are irreversible and should be made with care, as Aldo
Leopold observed: 'Wilderness is a resource which can shrink but not
grow." 412
The Antiquities Act delegates authority directly to the President,
rather than to an executive official such as the Secretary of the Inte-
rior.4 13 Some have viewed this arrangement as a fourth core value of
the Act, subjecting the nation's highest leader to direct public ac-
countability for the designation of monuments. For example, one
federal district court declined to overturn President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's designation of a 221,610-acre monument in Wyoming.414
408 See Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1157-58 (D. Alaska 1978) (considering a
challenge to executive action under the Antiquities Act and secretarial action under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act); supra Part I.B.4.
409 Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1165.
410 See Bryner, supra note 390, at 2 (stating that "[m]any of America's most beloved
parks began as national monuments" and citing as examples Grand Canyon National Park
(1919), Olympic National Park (1938), Bryce Canyon National Park (1924), Grand Teton
National Park (1950), Zion National Park (1956), Arches National Park (1971), Denali
National Park (1980), and Death Valley National Park (1994)); see also Rasband, supra note
407, at 490-92 (noting that all Utah national parks except Canyonlands began as national
monuments, and concluding that although those parks "are now among the crown jewels
of Utah's tourism industry,. . . the embers of resentment toward unilateral federal preser-
vation efforts continue[ ] to smolder").
411 Congress has found it desirable to reverse the designation of monuments on only a
few occasions. See Bryner, supra note 390, at 2. Admittedly, it might be difficult for Con-
gress to pass legislation repealing a monument designation against the threat of an execu-
tive veto by the very President who established the monument in the first instance. See
Pendley, supra note 12, at 11 (describing President Franklin D. Roosevelt's veto of legisla-
tion to abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument in Wyoming). However, it is often
the case that presidents establish monuments at the end of their terms to firm up their
environmental legacy, and the succeeding president might have less incentive to veto re-
pealing legislation. See Bryner, supra note 390, at 2.
412 ALDo LEOPOLD, WVilderness, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 199 (1949).
413 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
414 See supra Part I.B.2.
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The court found that the President was directly accountable to the
"propaganda" of the press and to Congress, making judicial interfer-
ence undesirable.415
Recent practice supports the notion that presidents are indeed
cognizant of their public accountability and that they modify their be-
havior accordingly. For example, President Clinton's designation of
the Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument in Utah received extensive
coverage in prominent national newspapers, including strident criti-
cism. 4 16  Opponents claimed that President Clinton deliberately
avoided notifying local politicians, citing the fact that the Utah monu-
ment ceremony was actually conducted in the neighboring state of
Arizona.417 Subsequent actions of the President were more solicitous
of local concerns, suggesting that the first-term President was mindful
of the public reaction to his monument proclamation. Accordingly,
President Clinton took the unusual step of assigning to the BLM, an
agency typically responsive to local commodity producers on the pub-
lic lands, the task of managing the monument.418 Moreover, the Pres-
ident ordered the BLM to promulgate a management plan pursuant
to regulations, which would necessarily entail public notice and com-
ment.419 The planning team included both federal and state officials,
relying heavily upon the participation of local communities. 420 Upon
completion, the plan drew "muted praise" from both environmental-
ists and local leaders.421 Among other things, the plan allows for lim-
415 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
416 See, e.g., supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
417 See Pendley, supra note 12, at 8; see also Hilary Stout & Bruce Ingersoll, Clinton
Shields Utah Lands from Development, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1996, at A4 (observing that
"[b]ecause Utah happens to be the most Republican of all the states, Mr. Clinton played to
the rest of the West, traveling to Arizona to sign the presidential proclamation [of the
Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument of Utah] at the rim of the Grand Canyon"). Sup-
porters of President Clinton refute the charge that his monuments were proclaimed with-
out "sufficient public discourse." See Leave Antiquities Act Alone: Don't Hang Beltway Bias
Around Our Monuments, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 25, 2001, at B10 (observing that "[tjhere is a
perception among some that the Clinton administration designated various national mon-
uments in a vacuum, without sufficient public discourse" and concluding that at least "[a]s
far as Arizona's five new monuments are concerned, that's just plain wrong").
418 Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223, 50,225 (Sept. 18, 1996). One staunch
critic noted that the preservationist-oriented National Park Service managed nearly all
monuments, and conceded that with regard to grazing, hunting, and other local concerns,
"the BLM is much more respectful than the [National Park Service]"). See Pendley, supra
note 12, at 9-10.
419 Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. at 50,225.
420 See Paul Larmer, Is the Grand Staircase-Escalante a Model Monument?, HIGH CoUmrRY
NEws (Paonia, Colo.), Nov. 22, 1999, at 13; see also Jim Woolf, Counties to Get Cashfor Monu-
ment Planning, SALT LAKE TPi.B., Oct. 23, 1996, at A6 (noting that the Grand Staircase-
Escalante proclamation "contains few details about how the area would be managed, rely-
ing instead on a team of local, state and federal representatives to develop a long-term plan
for the area").
421 Larmer, supra note 420.
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ited development in the surrounding communities. 422 Moreover, the
Clinton administration successfully negotiated a fourteen million dol-
lar federal buyout of a private coal company's leases4 23 and a fifty mil-
lion dollar federal purchase of school trust lands owned by Utah and
located within the boundaries of the monument.424 Overall, the ex-
ample suggests that the Antiquities Act, as written, creates powerful
incentives for presidents to act in a politically accountable manner,
crafting compromises that protect both the national interest in expe-
ditious land preservation and local financial needs.
Thoughtful commentators have suggested that the Antiquities
Act should include formal public notice and comment as a prerequi-
site to the creation of new monuments, 425 raising the issue of whether
the Act's scheme of public accountability by the President is an effective
substitute for public participation before an administrative agency.
There is a credible body of evidence that suggests a cautious, but not
overwhelming, response in the affirmative. Through several statutes,
Congress has indicated its intention to impose procedural safeguards
upon federal administrative agencies, but not upon presidents them-
selves. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires
public notice and comment for agency rulemaking,426 a requirement
that courts have deemed inapplicable to the President.427 Moreover,
NEPA requires an environmental impact statement of all "agencies" of
the federal government.428 One federal court found "absurd" the
claim that the President's consultation with the Secretary of the Inte-
rior concerning national monuments rendered the President subject
to the requirements of NEPA.429 Even in the modern, post-NEPA era,
Congress has passed legislation indicating its awareness that in certain
cases, it may be desirable to empower high-level, accountable officials
to take prompt actions without first providing an opportunity for pub-
422 See id.
423 See id
424 a; see also Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, Nos. 2:97CV479, 2:97CV492,
2:97CV863, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15852, at *24-28 (D. Utah Aug. 12, 1999) (discussing
congressional ratification of land exchange and $50 million cash payment to Utah).
It appears that President Clinton took increasing care to provide for advance public
notice and comment concerning monument designations during his second term of office.
See Secretary Babbitt Makes Monument Recommendations to President Clinton, U.S. NEWSWiRE, Jan.
8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4138720 (giving notice in press release of two proposed na-
tional monuments and stating that "[i]n the past few weeks, Secretary Babbitt has visited
each area and discussed protection options with local elected officials and residents").
425 See, e.g., Rasband, supra note 407, at 560-61; Zellmer, supra note 71, at 1043-47.
426 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
427 See Zelhmer, supra note 71, at 1044 & n.581 (citing cases indicating that the Presi-
dent is not an agency within the meaning of the APA).
428 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
429 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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lic hearings.430 This position seems to recognize that, in some situa-
tions, the value of landscape protection may outweigh the value of
advance public notice and comment, particularly where an accounta-
ble official merely freezes the status quo to facilitate subsequent con-
gressional action.43'
C. Recognizing Wild Landscapes as Cultural Antiquities
Presidents have been criticized harshly for using the Antiquities
Act to protect not only human artifacts, but also expansive land-
scapes.43 2 The criticism reflects the assumption that Congress did not
intend to preserve both nature and civilization under the same statu-
tory scheme. Leaving aside for the moment actual congressional in-
tent, one might wonder whether such an interpretation would even be
possible under our cultural norms and traditions. A brief survey of nat-
ural resource thinkers suggests that there is solid philosophical prece-
dent for the unification of nature and culture. This line of inquiry
indicates that the Antiquities Act-zealously interpreted and applied
by presidents-might not represent merely a rogue interpretation cre-
ated out of whole cloth; rather, it draws upon venerable, holistic nar-
ratives scattered throughout Western culture and elsewhere.
Prior to the passage of the Antiquities Act, American writers and
artists had reflected upon the interconnectedness of humans and na-
ture. Some Native American writings describe a close relationship
with the land. For example, in resisting white encroachment onto the
Great Plains in the late nineteenth century, one Comanche elder
stated to a congressional commission:
I was born upon the prairie, where the wind blew free, and there
was nothing to break the light of the sun. I was born where there
were no enclosures ... I want to die there, and not within walls. I
know every stream and every wood between the Rio Grande and the
Arkansas.4 33
In the early nineteenth century, artist Thomas Cole praised the Amer-
ican wilderness as worthy of painting, noting its prominent historical
430 See FLPMA § 204(e), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (allowing Secretary of the Interior to
make emergency withdrawals for periods up to three years); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp.
1155, 1161 (D. Alaska 1978) (holding that emergency withdrawals under section 204(e) of
FLPMA do not trigger NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement).
431 See generally Zellmer, supra note 71, at 1046-47 (arguing that a notice and comment
requirement should be imposed upon monument designations, but conceding that "[a]
substantive draw-back [of such required procedures] is that the imposition of extensive
preliminary requirements may result in fewer designations, and less federal land ultimately
placed in protective status").
432 See Rasband, supra note 407, at 483-87, 490-92, 515-19.
433 Ten Bears, Speech Before the Congressional Peace Commission (Oct. 10, 1867), in
DISTANT HORIZON: DOCUMENTS FROM THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN WEST, at 217
(Gary Noy ed., 1999).
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and legendary associations. 434 Henry David Thoreau, who extolled
the virtues of wild nature, also valued the intermingling of wildness
and civilization. 43 5 Thoreau observed: "It is in vain to dream of a wild-
ness distant from ourselves. There is none such. It is the bog in our
brains and bowels, the primitive vigor of Nature in us, that inspires
that dream."4 6 During the discussion that preceded the creation of
Yellowstone National Park in 1872, Thoreau argued that both wildlife
and native human settlements should be protected together in "na-
tional preserves."437 Landscape designer Frederick Law Olmsted be-
lieved that the national character was reflected in the American
landscape.43 8 Olmsted sought to incorporate nature into urban envi-
ronments through the presence of parks, broad avenues, and green-
ways, an approach perhaps best exemplified by his plans for Central
Park in New York City, the Stanford University campus in California,
and the U.S. Capitol grounds in Washington, D.C.439
In the post-Antiquities Act period, still other American philoso-
phers continued to call for a closer synthesis of nature and society.
Aldo Leopold, who articulated a strong wilderness ethic, also worked
for the protection of nature in areas marked by a human presence. 440
In A Sand County Almanac, Leopold called for a new land ethic synthe-
sizing both humans and nonhumans.441 In 1942, Leopold expounded
upon this land ethic: "'Who is the land? We are, but no less the
meanest flower that blows. Land ecology discards at the outset the
fallacious notion that the wild community is one thing, the human
community another.' 442 More recently, the late Harvard Professor of
zoology and geology Stephen Jay Gould made the "humanistic confes-
434 See HtrrH, supra note 228, at 50-51.
435 Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11, 24-25 & n.76 (2000) (observing that "[a]t Walden Pond,
Thoreau hardly was removed from civilization. His cabin lay just steps from the railroad
track, and he dined weekly at the family home in Concord.").
436 Henry David Thoreau, Journal, Aug. 30, 1856, epigraph to SIMON SCHAMA, LAND-
SCAPE AND MEMORY (1995).
437 Doremus, supra note 435, at 26-27 (describing 1858 article published by Thoreau
in the Atlantic Monthly).
438 See generally WrroLD RmBczwsvi, A CLEARING IN THE DIsrANCE: FREDERICK LAW OLI.-
STED AND AMERICA IN THE NiNETEENTH CENTuRY (1999) (describing the work of Frederick
Law Olmsted, who lived from 1822-1903).
439 See id. at 21, 192-93, 320-21, 368-72.
440 See Aldo Leopold, The Wilderness and Its Place in Forest Recreational Policy, 19 J. FoR-
Es-rRy 718, 719 (1921); see also Doremus, supra note 435, at 33-35 (observing that "Leopold
spent years restoring a worked-out farm in Wisconsin to biotic health").
441 See ALDo LEoPoLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND Courrv ALMANAC, supra note 412, at
201, 204 (explaining that "a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of
the land-community to plain member and citizen of it"). See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, A
Sand County Almanac at 50: Leopold in the New Centuy, 30 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,058 (2000) (reassessing Leopold's work).
442 Freyfogle, supra note 441, at 10,066 & n.64 (quoting Leopold's 1942 speech to the
seventh North American Wildlife Conference).
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sion" that although he loved nature for itself-nature that is "out
there"-he preferred natural areas that bear the trace of a human
presence. 443 He sought his "aesthetic optimum right in the middle,
where human activity has tweaked or shaped a landscape." 444 In his
own defense, Professor Gould hastened to add that there is no true
distinction between nature and culture, and that pure examples of
either realm are scarce "when plastic flotsam pervades the seas... and
when almost every spot perceived with rapture as 'virgin' wilderness
(at least here in northeastern America) really represents old farmland
reclaimed by new forest. ' 445 In an example reminiscent of the con-
gressional impetus for passage of the Antiquities Act,44 6 Professor
Gould cited Hopi pueblo towns among his favorite landscapes, admir-
ing their construction from "local rocks as a layer on the tops of mesas
made of horizontal strata, so that the town, from a distance, can
hardly be distinguished from the natural layers below, a village
marked as a human construction only by vertical ladders protruding
from the tops of kivas." 447 Similarly, writer Terry Tempest Williams
recalls her discovery of cultural artifacts of the Colorado Plateau, con-
cluding that human artifacts are intimately connected to the land-
scape: "If these artifacts are lifted from their birthplace they cease to
speak. Like a piece of coral broken from its reef, they lose their color,
becoming pale and brittle."448
This narrative of unity has even permeated American fiction.
Novelist Barbara Kingsolver drew upon her childhood experiences in
the Congo as the daughter of medical and public-health workers to
write The Poisonwood Bible.449 Told through the eyes of the children of
Christian missionaries, the novel keenly observes the vast gulf between
American and Congolese society.450 Despite its status as fiction, the
work is rooted in history and fact.4 51 One of the novel's young protag-
onists learns of the Congolese word muntu, which encompasses both
humans and nature. Her young African friend tells her that the word
means more than just man, for "[t]he word of the ancestors is pulled
into trees and men . . . and this allows them to stand and live as
443 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, LEONARDO'S MOUNTAIN OF CLAMS AND THE DIET OF WORMS:
ESSAYS ON NATURAL HIsTORY 2-6 (1998).
444 Id. at 3.
445 Id. at 2.
446 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
447 GOULD, supra note 443, at 3.
448 TERRY TEMPEST WILLIAMS, PIECES OF WHITE SHELL: AJouRNEY TO NAVAJOLAND 125
(1984).
449 BARBARA KINGSOLVER, THE POISOIVOOD BIBLE, at ix-x (1998).
450 See, e.g., id. at 167.
451 Id. at ix (author's note stating that despite the novel's categorization as fiction, "the
Congo in which I placed [the characters] is genuine. The historical figures and events
described here are as real as I could render them with the help of recorded history.").
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muntu. ''452 The American girl responds in bewilderment, asking
whether trees are also muntu, whether trees are a type of person.453
Her Congolese friend, Nelson, puzzled by her "failure to understand
such a simple thing," replies, "Of course. Just look at them. They
both have roots and a head."454
In several instances throughout the world, this philosophical and
fictional literature of synthesis has been reduced to concrete reality.
The Gwaii Haanas area of the Queen Charlotte Islands of British Co-
lumbia has been the home of the native Haida people for more than
ten thousand years.4 55 Canada has preserved this homeland as a na-
tional park (the Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve) that also func-
tions as a Haida heritage site. Representatives of the Haida Nation
continue to live on the islands, serving as "watchmen" who protect
both the natural and cultural heritage of the park.456 The park's visi-
tor handbook notes that "[f]or more than 10,000 years, the Haida
have been an integral part of this remarkable landscape. Their com-
munities thrive in the close relationships of abundance between sea,
sky and forest. 457
Similarly, in Russia some thirty native families of aboriginal
Evenis live within the boundaries of a five-thousand-square-mile na-
ture park in the far eastern part of the country.458 The families subsist
by hunting, trapping, and fishing within an unspoiled tract of moun-
tains and forests that has been designated as a United Nations world
heritage site.459 With the approval of the Russian government, the
Evenis have returned to their ancestral lands in order to assist in the
management and preservation of the park.46 0 A representative of the
World Wildlife Fund for Nature observed that the organization previ-
ously preferred to exclude people from natural areas, but that it is
now successfully integrating local people and landscapes.461
Modem thinkers have begun to call for the theoretical synthesis
of natural and human landscapes, but have recognized that their pro-
452 Id. at 209-10.
453 I at 210.
454 Id.
455 GWAII HAANAs NATIONAL PARK RESERVE AND HAIDA HERITAGE SITE, VISITOR HAND-
BOOK 5 (2000) (on file with author, only slightly moldy from an idyllic sea kayak trip
through the Queen Charlotte Islands).
456 Id. at 36.
457 Id. at 5.
458 Gary Strieker, Russia Returns Native People to Ancestral Lands in Nature Park,
CNN.coMi, Sept. 20, 2000, at http://wwv.cnn.com/2000/NATURE/09/19/russia.park
(noting that "the area has also been the home of aboriginal Evenis for centuries, before
the Soviet government forced them into towns and villages to work on state farms").
459 I&
460 See id
461 See id.
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posals may be a double-edged sword.462 On the one hand, the inte-
gration of humans into the natural world may serve as a politically
palatable excuse for the continued conquest of nature. 463 On the
other hand, recognizing a bond between humans and nature may be
an important step toward fostering a thoughtful discussion concern-
ing the future of our wild lands. Such a unified approach might sup-
port a newly invigorated role for the Antiquities Act in the twenty-first
century, validating a statute that presidents have consistently used to
protect both human artifacts and awe-inspiring landscapes. In his
book, Landscape and Memory, historian Simon Schama articulated per-
haps the most hopeful vision of this synthesis of nature and culture:
There is nothing inherently shameful about [the human occupa-
tion of wilderness]. Even the landscapes that we suppose to be most
free of our culture may turn out, on closer inspection, to be its
product. And it is the argument of Landscape and Memory that this is
a cause not for guilt and sorrow but celebration. Would we rather
that Yosemite, for all its overpopulation and overrepresentation,
had never been identified, mapped, emparked? The brilliant
meadow-floor which suggested to its first eulogists a pristine Eden
was in fact the result of regular fire-clearances by its Ahwahneechee
Indian occupants. 464
The author expresses his hope that "by revealing the richness, antiq-
uity, and complexity of our landscape tradition, [the book can] show
just how much we stand to lose. '465 As a result of that realization,
perhaps humans will comprehend the strength of their links to, and
dependence upon, nature.466 Ironically-by extension of Schama's
philosophy-the most important "antiquity" preserved under the An-
tiquities Act may be the rich, but understated, Western tradition of
landscape preservation.
462 See generally Doremus, supra note 435, at 63-65 (discussing future steps toward inte-
grating concepts of nature and humanity, as well as potential obstacles to this endeavor).
463 See id. Professor Doremus argues that, "[i]f progress is to be made in the law of
nature protection, the political discussion must more closely address the crux of the prob-
lem, asking how humans can live with and in nature." Id. at 63. She urges that the "new
discourse.., should be as much about people as it is about nature. It should explain how
people can fit into nature and fit nature into their lives." Id. at 65. However, Professor
Doremus cautions that nature advocates should be wary of the rhetoric of sustainable de-
velopment, which "could be used to paper over the nature problem, giving lip service to
esthetic and ethical concerns while giving primacy to economic uses." IME But see Wiener,
supra note 208, at 352 & n.135 (rejecting the argument that a holistic view of the human
role in nature "invites unbridled human mischief against ecosystems"). Rather, Professor
Wiener asserts that "human actions still need to be judged, but judged by their conse-
quences rather than by their categorical attributes.... The question is not whose hand
built the dam, beaver or human, but rather what impacts will the dam have on the river?"
Id.
464 ScHAmA, supra note 436, at 9.
465 Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
466 See id.
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CONCLUSION: WHY EVERYONE COMPLAINS, BUT No ONE
DOES ANY-IING
Historical evidence from the past century demonstrates that the
Antiquities Act may be the statute that politicians love to hate. Con-
gressional representatives have been willing to speak out against mon-
uments, but few have had realistic expectations of significantly
amending the Antiquities Act. As one Arizona congressman acknowl-
edged with respect to the Clinton monuments, "'Fighting over legisla-
tion to undo or rollback these regulations may fly well with people
back home, but it's a waste of our energy.' ' 467 Moreover, few politi-
cians may be willing to pay the political price associated with taking
action to weaken the President's authority to designate monuments.
Polls indicate strong support for environmental protection in general,
and for monument designations in particular.468
Although beleaguered and berated, the Antiquities Act has en-
joyed consistent support from a broad spectrum of forces. Presidents
have zealously exercised their delegated authority to proclaim monu-
ments, an executive prerogative that courts have been reluctant to dis-
turb throughout the twentieth century. Congress has threatened to
weaken or repeal the Antiquities Act on numerous occasions, but it
has had very little success in this endeavor. Instead, Congress has
often ratified executive monuments by designating them as national
parks. Based upon this support by all three branches of government,
John Leshy stated during his tenure as Interior Department Solicitor
that the "'Antiquities Act... is one of the most successful environ-
mental laws in American history."' 469
This Article has argued that the implicit strength of the Antiqui-
ties Act lies in its potential to protect both natural and human land-
scapes under the same statutory scheme. Ironically, that synthesis has
also raised the ire of critics. The recognition of humans as a compo-
nent part of natural systems flies in the face of a long historical tradi-
tion that recognizes a rigid dichotomy between nature and culture.
This Article has presented a countervailing tradition-the narrative of
467 Eric Pianin, Staying Power of Clinton's Edicts: UndoingEnvironmental Rules Will Be Hard
for Bush, GOP, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2001, at A19 (quoting Republican Rep. Jim Kolbe,
senior member of the House Appropriations Committee). Similarly, western Republicans
have indicated that "although they are unhappy about the [monument] designations, a
full-scale challenge would be time-consuming and ultimately pointless." Id.
468 See supra notes 390-92 and accompanying text; see also Dana Milbank & Eric Pianin,
Bush to Counter Environmental Criticism: Outrage over Regulatory Changes Pushes Administration
to Tout Green Policies, WASH. PosT, Mar. 31, 2001, at A6 (noting that the criticism over Presi-
dent George W. Bush's attempts to weaken President Clinton's national monuments and
other environmental measures "has apparently affected public opinion. The latest Wash-
ington Post/ABC News poll found that, by 61 percent to 31 percent, Americans thought
Bush cared more about the interests of large corporations than ordinary people.").
469 Hearing on H.R. 1487, supra note 53, at 20.
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synthesis-as reflected by the manner in which the Act has been uti-
lized throughout the century. Congress and the courts should explic-
itly recognize that these special landscapes may qualify for protection
as national monuments under the Antiquities Act, thereby acknowl-
edging the interrelationship of humans and nature.
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